

JPRS 69712

31 August 1977

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
No. 802

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

20000405 169

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET | 1. Report No. JPRS 69712 | 2. | 3. Recipient's Accession No. |
| 4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON USSR - POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS, No. 802 | | 5. Report Date 31 August 1977 | |
| 7. Author(s) | | 6. | |
| 9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201 | | 8. Performing Organization Rept. No. | |
| | | 10. Project/Task/Work Unit No. | |
| | | 11. Contract/Grant No. | |
| 12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above | | 13. Type of Report & Period Covered | |
| | | 14. | |
| 15. Supplementary Notes | | | |
| 16. Abstracts The report contains information on government and party structure, policy and problems, law and social regulation, education, and cultural and social aspects of Soviet life, trade union and Komsomol activities. | | | |
| 17. Key Words and Document Analysis: 17a. Descriptors USSR Political Science Sociology Government Communism Law (Jurisprudence) Education Culture (Social Sciences) | | | |
| 17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms | | | |
| 17c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5F, 5K | | | |
| 18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22151 | | 19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED | 21. No. of Pages 62 |
| | | 20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED | 22. Price PC A04 |

31 August 1977

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 802

| CONTENTS | PAGE |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Weakening of U.S.-British 'Special Relationship' Seen (G. Vorontsov; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, May 77) | 1 |
| Belorussia's Masherov Eulogizes Russian Role in USSR History (P. M. Masherov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 16 Jul 77) | 5 |
| Moscow's Grishin Details Guidelines for Improving Industrial Production Efficiency (V. V. Grishin; MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 14 Jul 77) | 10 |
| Novosti Observer Lauds SEATO Dismemberment (A. Lavrent'ev; SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 5 Jul 77) | 19 |
| Prosecutor Cites Juvenile Delinquency Problems (S. Gusev; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 13 Jul 77) | 23 |
| FDR-Churchill Secret Wartime Correspondence Reviewed (Ernst Henry; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, Jun 77) | 29 |
| New Book Hails Relaxation Process, Stresses Political Cooperation (D. Tomashevskiy; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, May 77) | 41 |
| Book Criticizes Modern Bourgeois Concepts (A. Stepanov; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, Jun 77) | 49 |
| Book Analyzes Structural Problems of Capitalist Economy (S. Pervushin; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, Jun 77) | 52 |

WEAKENING OF U.S.-BRITISH 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP' SEEN

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 14 Apr 77 pp 36-45

[Article by G. Vorontsov: "The United States and Britain: the 'Special Relationship' Today"]

[Excerpt] An important factor contributing to the strengthening of cooperation between the United States and Britain is the class solidarity of American and British imperialism and their serious concern at the growth of the workers movement in West Europe and the successes of the left and progressive forces in a number of countries of the continent. Here, insofar as under modern conditions the United States is restricted in its actions as a consequence of the general disrepute of American foreign policy, Washington is increasingly transferring the initiative to its allies, including Britain. This tactic was put to the test, in particular, in Portugal.

Coordination of actions between American and British diplomacy is to be observed on a whole number of cardinal international problems. These amount to the package of East-West mutual relations, policy in relation of the "third world" countries, and patronage of the racist regimes in the south of Africa (a joint American-British plan has been drawn up, for example, for assisting the white settlers to the tune of 1.5-2 billion dollars). Although not unconditionally, Britain nevertheless supports the line being pursued by the United States in the Near East.

The new U.S. Administration headed by J. Carter has confirmed the "special relationship" with London. British Prime Minister J. Callaghan was the first of the West European leaders to pay an official visit to Washington, in March 1977, during which a broad circle of problems was discussed. Assessing the contemporary state of Anglo-American relations, the U.S. President declared that Great Britain was "the United States' closest ally and friend" and that there are "security agreements and trade agreements" with it "which we do not have with a single other country."

Thus there exists a relatively broad sphere of interaction between Washington and London which has recently been noticeably stepped up.

Despite the definite strengthening of relations between the United States and Britain at the current stage, these relations will evidently be subject to erosion in the long term. The one-time "cordial" Anglo-American alliance is slowly but surely receding into the past. A rebirth of the former Anglo-Saxon alliance in Atlantic relations is hardly possible.

The traditional proximity of Britain and the United States has not prevented them from engaging in earnest rivalry with one another, whether this amount to struggle for sales markets and sources of raw material in the "third world" countries, European affairs, or other issues. After Great Britain's admittance to the EEC, Anglo-American relations entered a new phase, which is characterized by London's slow isolation from Washington. This process promises to be prolonged and contradictory.

Washington understands that London can hardly lay claim to leading positions in the Common Market. This is connected both with the state of the British economy and the fall in Britain's influence in the international arena and also with the prolonged period of confrontation between Britain and the EEC members. London's adaptation to the Common Market is far from complete.

It is also doubtful that London will permanently be able to provide a channel of communications between the Community countries and the United States. In this plane it is dealing with a serious competitor in the shape of Bonn, which has repeatedly acted in the role of peacemaker between Atlantism and Europeanism. Nor is the buildup of elements of Atlantism in France's foreign policy contributing to a strengthening of Britain's exclusive position.

Whereas in the 1960's the United States was guaranteed the support of Great Britain in currency and tariff questions, the United States will hardly be able to count on such help in future clashes with its West European competitors. Equally, the North Atlantic partner far from always displays a readiness to meet Britain half-way. As U.S. Vice President W. Mondale's London visit in January 1977 showed, the British Government failed to achieve an expansion of British exports to the United States. Paris' consent to admitting London to the Common Market attested a slackening of Anglo-French contradictions.

The formation of the "Nine" will undoubtedly exacerbate the rivalry between the United States and West Europe. For it will be a question of the United States opposing "an economically integrated West Europe with a GNP of 700 billion dollars and a population of 270 million."¹⁴

A very important feature determining the prospects of London's foreign policy is the "Europeanization" of British trade. Thus whereas in 1960 the West European countries accounted for 30 percent of British exports, this figure was 43 percent in 1972. At the same time the corresponding indicator for the United States increased only negligibly--from 9 to 12.3 percent. West

Europe's share of British imports in 1960 constituted 29 percent, but had reached 44 percent in 1972. In the same period the EEC countries' share of British exports increased from 15 to 22.9 percent, and the share of its imports rose from 14.3 to 24.4 percent.

As a whole, Britain's trade volume with the EEC members is currently more than triple its commodity turnover with the United States.¹⁵

By virtue of the objective course of events, Britain is becoming involved increasingly deeply in transatlantic rivalry, which is characterized by unprecedented intensiveness. The competitive struggle between the American and West European aviation companies has, in particular, recently become very intense in connection, primarily, with the problem of flights of the Anglo-French Concorde supersonic aircraft to the United States, in which even government bodies have become involved. "The time has come to demand an end to all this sabotage," the SUNDAY EXPRESS wrote in describing the position of the U.S. Administration. "Why do we not tell them that unless they settle on a firm time for the start of Concorde flights, Britain will place a total embargo on purchases of American military and commercial aircraft." The reasons behind the confrontation are to be found, of course, not in references to the "impermissible noise level and excessive environmental pollution." Having rejected the American explanations as unfounded, Britain and France have stated that "the ultimate banning of Concorde flights will undoubtedly have political consequences." The Concorde problem was brought to the fore again in the spring of 1977. J. Callaghan's symbolic gesture--his arrival in the United States on the supersonic airliner--was designed to demonstrate London's resolve to defend its companies' interests.

Power engineering problems are causing serious fissures in Anglo-American relations. London by no means wishes to renounce its autonomy in this question and put itself on a par with the United States. Serious disagreements were revealed between Britain and the United States during the preparations for the conference on international economic cooperation in Paris. It should be borne in mind that although London agreed to a compromise, a new flareup of contradictions cannot be ruled out. Britain counts on being an oil exporter by 1980 through exploitation of North Sea resources. Its dependence on the energy policy of the United States and other Western countries will thereby diminish.

Another source of disagreements has been revealed on certain aspects of military policy. Like certain other NATO countries, Great Britain is aspiring to strengthen its own positions in the sphere of the production and sales of arms and military equipment, squeezing out overseas competitors. West Europe's military-industrial concerns have already begun a struggle for redistribution of the NATO arms market. The setting up on the basis of the Eurogroup of an autonomous armaments agency testifies to the intention of West European military-industrial companies to rectify the balance in the sphere of the arms trade which is unfavorable to them. British Defense Secretary R. Mason demanded that arms purchases be "two-sided," that is,

that the Americans purchase more West European weapons. In the spring of 1977 Britain officially turned down the American AWACS early-warning aviation system, deciding to create its own similar Nimrod system.

As a whole, the weakening of the "special relationship" with Washington and the simultaneous strengthening of a European orientation in Great Britain's foreign policy represents a distinctly unfolding trend. "Britain has opted for the concept of European 'partnership' as a counterweight to Atlantic 'mutual dependence,'" the British author A. Williams writes. "...Britain now prefers a new partnership between the United States and Europe (West--G. V.) to privileged Anglo-American ties."¹⁶ At the same time under current conditions London's "special relationship" with Washington retains a definite reserve of durability. It will evidently continue in one form or another for a more or less protracted period.

The prospects of bilateral ties will largely depend on the state of American-West European relations and also on the pace at which Britain draws closer to the Community's continental members.

FOOTNOTES

14. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1973, p 99.

15. "Annual Abstract of Statistics," 1975, p 288, 290.

16. SOCIALIST COMMENTARY, March 1975, p 7.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAVDA, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1977.

8850

CSO: 1800

BELORUSSIA'S MASHEROV EULOGIZES RUSSIAN ROLE IN USSR HISTORY

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Jul 77 p 2 LD

[Article by P. M. Masherov, first secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia Central Committee: "Great Russia Rallied Us"]

[Text] The sociopolitical content of our everyday existence, the life and labor of Soviet people and their thoughts and aspirations are now refined by events of epoch-making significance--the forthcoming 60th anniversary of Great October, the nationwide discussion of the draft new USSR Constitution and the powerful influence of the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. These events permeate the destiny of each of the people of our united, multinational motherland and all generations of Soviet people, and literally every person in our country.

The draft fundamental law of the land of the soviets elaborated in accordance with the instructions of the 25th Party Congress under the direct leadership of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Constitutional Commission, is a moving manifesto, a charter of the society of developed socialism warmly and unanimously approved by all Soviet people, a document of great scientific and theoretical significance and tremendous political repercussions. Its well-turned lines fully reflect the world-historic victories and achievements of the party and people in the heroic struggle to build socialism and communism.

Mentally surveying today, from the height of what has been achieved and accomplished, the path which the motherland of October has traveled by the only correct course--the general course of our Leninist party--we have a feeling of legitimate pride in the impressive results of the socioeconomic and spiritual progress of the socialist fatherland and each of the fraternal Soviet republics.

October 1917 permanently accorded the Belorussian people, like the other peoples of our country, the proud name and lofty title of full masters of their destiny and led them out into the orbit of communist civilization.

From lack of rights and poverty to social and national renaissance, to freedom and happiness, from darkness and ignorance to the full emancipation of the human spirit, the bright flourishing of science and culture and the individual's abilities and gifts, from a primitive economy to the giants of modern industry and large-scale, highly mechanized kolkhoz and sovkhoz production--these are the scales of the changes and the dynamism of the all-round development of Belorussia in the great Soviet international [internatsionalnoye] community.

Everything in which we are rich and in which we take pride is inextricably linked in the Belorussian people's consciousness with the socialist system, Soviet power, the party of the communists and the life-giving friendship of all nations and nationalities of the USSR. Mounting the steps of their new, true history, they have always felt and continue to feel in everything the colossal creative force and inspiring selflessness of the fraternal solidarity, mutual aid and comradely support of all Soviet peoples.

The republic's working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and intelligentsia hold sacred their blood tie with the motherland--the Soviet homeland--and are happy to feel that they are an integral particle of a single whole--the unprecedented historic social and international community of people called the Soviet people. They are happy to create and work, to struggle and triumph in the indestructible alliance forged by the party, in the combat and labor community of socialist nations, forever rallied by great Russia, and living in accordance with Lenin's behests and the traditions of international fraternity.

The Belorussian working people, sacredly treasuring the sense of being a single family, realize with confidence and welcome with special gratitude and thanks the outstanding services rendered by the heroic Russian working class and great Russian people to revolutionary history and their enormous contribution to the augmentation of the attainments of socialism.

On the barricades of class battles, on the battlefields fighting in defense of the achievements of socialism, in the periods of the restoration of the economy destroyed by the hurricanes of war, in the everyday working life of the Soviet five-year plans, in the hard times of the harshest trials and in the bright years of creation, the Belorussian people have fully felt and continue to feel the strong backing, constant aid and ardent support, warm concern and sympathetic attention of the fraternal Russian people.

Here the language of figures and statistics is powerless to reflect fully the height and significance and entire depth of Russian generosity and cordiality and, I would say, the unhesitating readiness to come to the aid of their brothers in class, work and combat. This readiness was demonstrated particularly powerfully during the hard years of the great patriotic war in which, from its first shots to the victory salute, the Russian people's patriotic selflessness acted as one of the mighty mobilizing and inspiring factors which nurtured the mass heroism, legendary courage

and staunchness of spirit of the fighters of the front and the rear services workers, the partisans and underground fighters and all those who fought in the single combat formation of the Soviet peoples.

Every page of our republic's revolutionary, combat and labor chronicle is full of the most vivid testimonies and living manifestations of the triumph and moral grandeur of the Soviet way of life, socialist internationalism and Lenin's nationalities policy. Still fresh in our memory are the unbelievably difficult and incomprehensibly complex tasks in liquidating the consequences of the war which faced the country as a whole and in particular the regions which had suffered from the enemy invasion. Unsubdued partisan Belorussia appeared totally burnt and devastated to the Soviet soldier who brought it liberation. And only the wonder-working, life-giving arteries of the great friendship of the Soviet peoples and reliance on their all-round aid and support helped us to make possible what seemed impossible and increased our powers tenfold in the selfless struggle for the speediest restoration of the economy and culture.

For 1945, when the country still needed colossal expenditures for the victorious completion of the war, the republic was allocated as a subsidy from the union resources R120 million, or over half its budgetary appropriations. In the first postwar five-year plan, R906 million of state capital investments were put into our national economy. These funds embodied the joint labor of the fraternal Soviet peoples and, above all, the Russian working class and all working people. At the same time industrial equipment, raw material, construction materials, agricultural equipment, livestock, seed and food were sent and thousands of specialists and skilled workers came to us from the RSFSR and the other republics.

Countless other, equally significant selfless acts of fraternity of the highest moral standard comprising, in their totality and diversity the very firm foundation of the living fabric of our daily life and the relations of collectivism and friendship engendered by socialism, are enshrined in documents and in the people's hearts.

The all-round aid rendered to the republic at all stages of its establishment and development with material resources, cadres and the transfer of experience in the most varied spheres of creation are being materialized today in the very rich fruit of the labor of our people. That is why, in taking pride in the world-famous motor vehicles and tractors with the trademark of Belorussian enterprises, we do not forget that their emergence at the end of the forties began with the plants of Gorkiy and Volgograd. That is why, in noting that the core of our industry is now made up of the most modern sectors of industry--machine building and machinetool building, electronics and radio engineering, chemicals and the petrochemical industry--we remember that their emergence embodied the efforts of the entire country and their operation is inconceivable without metal from Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, without the broadest cooperation with thousands of enterprises of all the union republics. That is why we also link the important

achievements in the sphere of the fundamental and applied sciences of our scientific research institutions with the established science schools created in the republic by many well-known scientists who once came to us from Moscow, Leningrad and other scientific centers of the USSR.

The moral-political unity and friendship of the Soviet peoples are the inexhaustable source and mighty accelerator of the invincible movement of our society along the road of Lenin, the road of October.

Now that equalization has virtually been insured in the economic and cultural levels of development of the fraternal republics, strict adherence to the principles of socialist internationalism is organically linked, above all, with the growth of the commitments and responsibility of each nation and nationality of the USSR to the entire Soviet people. For the Belorussian communists and working people the implementation of this natural law signifies making the maximum possible contribution to the treasury of the material and spiritual wealth of the multinational Soviet homeland. This has become the norm-setting and determining principle in the activity of our party organizations and all cadres and of every labor collective.

Fully aware of their great responsibility for the best use, in all-union interests, of the republic's economic potential which has trebled in the last two five-year plans alone--an economic potential which is an integral part of the country's single national economic complex--the urban and rural workers are building up their efforts in the struggle to implement the party's strategic directions toward increasing production efficiency and improving the quality of all work. In the mainstream of the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's fundamental instructions and recommendations, the Communist Party of Belorussia is paying special attention to questions of improving the leadership of the economy, improving planning and strengthening the connection between science and practice. In particular new, effective criteria have been elaborated and are being introduced everywhere for assessing the work of party, soviet and economic organs and labor collectives--criteria designed to encourage the commissioning of underlying reserves for the intensification of production and the steady improvement of efficiency and quality.

In resolving these tasks we again rely wholly on our common possession, our priceless capital--all-soviet [obshchesovetskiy] collective wisdom and very rich experience of economic and cultural building accumulated by all the fraternal peoples. The patriotic initiatives of the innovators of Moscow and Leningrad, Gorkiy and Lvov and other cities of the country have been taken up and widely disseminated in the republic.

All this is producing positive results. The plans for the first year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan have been successfully completed for the most important economic parameters. Work on fulfilling the pledges which the working people adopted for the jubilee year of Soviet power is now under way in the labor collectives at a high, strenuous pace. The 6-month results give grounds for asserting that the heights which have been outlined will be scaled.

And this means that by the time of the nationwide holiday the republic's industry will have produced at least R220 millions' worth of above-plan industrial output and new plants and factories will be commissioned, as will numerous social and consumer services projects. The rural workers are now waging a strenuous struggle to surpass their pledges in the sphere of crop farming and animal husbandry and are preparing comprehensively to bring in the good harvest of grain and other crops ripening in the kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields.

The working class, kolkhoz peasantry and intelligentsia of Soviet Belorussia believe it is their paramount patriotic and international duty and sacred commitment to augment steadily the economic and defense might of our Soviet motherland and are fully determined to mark the year of the 60th anniversary of Great October and the adoption of the new USSR Constitution with shock creative labor in all sectors of economic and cultural building and by the successful implementation of the tasks of communist creation set by the 25th CPSU Congress.

CSO: 1800

MOSCOW'S GRISHIN DETAILS GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY

Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jul 77 pp 1, 2

[Report on Moscow Gorkom First Secretary V. V. Grishin speech: "Higher Efficiency, Better Work Quality!]

[Text] Yesterday saw the conclusion of a city scientific-practical conference which discussed the principal directions of an increase in the efficiency and quality of work at the capital's industrial enterprises in the light of the demands advanced by the 25th CPSU Congress. V. Ya. Ashanin, head of the Party Building Department of the Moscow Gorkom's University of Marxism-Leninism, O. V. Kozlova, rector of the Moscow Management Institute imeni S. Ordzhonikidze, A. V. Glichev, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Standardization, T. S. Khachaturov, chief editor of the journal VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, and V. G. Smol'kov, chief editor of the journal SOTSIALISTICHESKOYE SOREVNOVANIYE, delivered reports on the sections' work at the concluding plenary session.

The conference was addressed by Moscow Gorkom First Secretary V. V. Grishin.

L. A. Borisov and V. P. Trushin, secretaries of the Moscow Gorkom, participated in the concluding plenary session.

A great deal of work has now been initiated in our country, V. V. Grishin said in his speech, on implementation of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. The working people are extensively discussing the draft new USSR Constitution. In his speech at the CPSU Central Committee May Plenum Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, observed that realization of the constitution's provisions should uplift to a qualitatively new level our entire state and economic activity and the entire work of the organs of power and management and enable millions of Soviet people to join even more actively in management of the economy.

Orientation of all sectors of the economy and of each enterprise toward increasing efficiency and quality is now the most important task. A reduction in proportional material and financial expenditure in output production, the rational use of fixed capital and labor resources, improvement of the structure of production and its quotas, and an improvement in the entire economic mechanism--all these are demands dictated by the need for the economy's accelerated development.

Questions of increasing the efficiency and quality of production are of particular significance for the further development of the capital's industry. Moscow is one of the country's major industrial centers. The capital accommodates a large number of enterprises of the machine-tool, instrument-building, automotive, electrical equipment, electronics and other sectors of industry whose products largely determine technical progress in the national economy.

A number of large-scale measures has been implemented in Moscow's industry in recent years to improve production and increase the efficiency and quality of work.

However, what has been achieved is insufficient. Industry has great unutilized reserves and opportunities. The task is to commission them and put them at the service of the further growth of the capital's economy.

Among the problems connected with the growth of production efficiency, the main one is the problem of an unswerving increase in labor productivity.

Much is being done in the city to increase labor productivity. Enterprises are being retooled, production processes are being mechanized and automated, and manual and labor-intensive operations are being reduced. Over 300 shops and sectors were automated and comprehensively mechanized and 655 transfer machines and rolling trains and much other highly productive equipment were installed in the last 2 years alone.

The struggle to increase labor productivity is of an increasingly mass nature. Approximately 400,000 workers have personal plans for raising labor productivity, which are being fulfilled, in the main.

At the same time we cannot rest content with what has been achieved. A lagging of the labor productivity growth rate behind that of production volume has been discerned recently. This is explained by the fact that a number of plants and factories which are not catering for a comprehensive approach to a solution of the tasks of increasing labor productivity are eliminating disproportions and "bottlenecks" in the development of individual production facilities only slowly and are engaging feebly in the mechanization and automation of labor-intensive processes. And, moreover, this work is being performed chiefly in basic production, and the discrepancy in the extent of provision of equipment to the basic and auxiliary production facilities is being reduced slowly.

Certain plants and factories are failing to meet targets with respect to reducing the labor-intensiveness of product manufacture. Enterprise managers are increasing the numbers of personnel, in excess of the plan, or striving for a reduction in the labor productivity growth targets.

At many plants and factories there are great losses of work time owing to absenteeism, idling, and failure to put in an appearance with the administration's permission. Cadre turnover is causing production great harm.

Jobs' provision with machinery and power is still growing too slowly. Advanced work means and methods of being disseminated insufficiently. Too little attention is being paid to improving labor norming. All this is applying the brakes to further labor productivity growth.

The managers and party organizations must thoroughly analyze the state of affairs related to labor productivity growth and elaborate and implement measures which would insure fulfillment of the fixed targets in respect to this indicator. More attention must be paid to increasing the enterprises' provision with equipment.

It is necessary to switch in planned fashion from partial to comprehensive mechanization and automation of production throughout the production engineering cycle, including auxiliary operations--auditing, transportation, warehousing, and so forth. Particular attention must be paid to questions of the mechanization and automation of heavy manual and auxiliary operations. It is necessary to create comprehensively mechanized and automated shops and enterprises. In performing this work it is necessary to make more extensive use of plants' and factories' internal possibilities and the enterprises' collaboration with the scientific research and design organizations.

Important significance is attached to the further improvement of the organization of labor and production, the intensification of intraplant specialization, and the development of collaboration and other measures whose implementation could yield a real saving on live labor.

It is essential to more extensively disseminate advanced experience, particularly the "Dinamo" Plant's method with respect to the elaboration of workers' personal plans, the Shchekino method, and so forth. More attention must be paid to perfecting the moral and material stimulation of increased labor productivity. It is necessary to more extensively introduce the piecework-bonus system of remuneration, raise the proportion of bonuses in wages, and take fuller account here of quantitative and qualitative work indicators.

The conference correctly pointed out, V. V. Grishin continued, that an important means of increasing production efficiency is an improvement in the use of fixed production capital. Much has been done in Moscow's industry in recent years to increase and renew fixed capital. The quantitative growth of fixed capital is being accompanied by qualitative changes and an increase in the proportion of progressive, highly productive equipment.

However, there has been a drop in the return on capital in Moscow's industry as a whole in recent years. This is to a certain extent a logical process under the conditions of modernization of enterprises and equipment renewal. At the same time we cannot fail to see that many enterprises are failing to pay due attention to the better utilization of fixed production capital and to an increase in the return on capital.

In a number of instances modernization is not being effect comprehensively, irrational use is being made of the capital investments and equipment allocated for this, and it is a long time before the due return is obtained. Nor is the slow assimilation of newly introduced capacity contributing to a growth in the return on capital.

It is the task of the party organizations and managers, in increasing the tempo of the modernization and retooling of the enterprises, to strive for the fuller use of created capacity, the maximum return from each ruble of invested capital, and the highest output, raise the shift-work coefficient, and, on this basis, unswervingly increase the return on capital. All this will reduce the requirement for new equipment and cadres and will enable us to economize on material and labor expenditure.

The business of the development and renewal of the active part of fixed production capital demands considerable improvement.

An unswerving increase in the capital-worker and power-worker ratios and an improvement in industrial production on the basis of modernization and retooling will remain the master line of the development of the capital's industry, this being the chief source of product manufacture and labor productivity growth.

An improvement in technique has an important place in further increasing production efficiency. In recent years the scientists and industrial specialists have achieved considerable results in the creation of new progressive production engineering processes.

At the same time production techniques at many plants fail to correspond to essential requirements.

It is essential that the industrial and scientific research institute workers step up their attention to these questions.

The decisions of the 25th party congress and the speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasize that a most important direction of the development of our economy is improvement of industry's structure, acceleration of production concentration, and improvement of economic management methods.

But production concentration is proceeding slowly in certain industrial sectors. There are frequently shortcomings and oversights in the creation

of associations. There are many instances of enterprises which become a part of an association retaining the former production structure with their own, frequently low-capacity procurement, transportation, repair, and other services. We still encounter instances of the mechanical association of enterprises, which sometimes not only fails to increase but even reduces the efficiency of production and fails to contribute to intensified specialization.

The concentration process has as of the present affected mainly the large and medium-sized enterprises and, chiefly, the mass production sectors, where the engineering level and production organization and specialization are at a relatively high level. At the same time there are many small enterprises in the city. The production efficiency indicators here are considerably lower than in associations and at large-scale enterprises.

The creation of associations requires a well-conceived approach, and not all enterprises can be incorporated in them by virtue of production specifics. But it is necessary to persistently improve the production structure where it is economically expedient to decisively undertake production concentration and to reduce in planned fashion the number of small-scale enterprises with a low level of efficiency.

It is necessary to strive for an improvement in production organization and to improve intraplant planning.

The conference has devoted much attention to questions of improving the quality of the industrial product and increasing the engineering level, reliability, and working life of the manufactured articles, V. V. Grishin continued. This is one of the most important problems in increasing social production efficiency. It directly affects the interests of all national economy sectors, and the fulfillment of the main task of the five-year plan largely depends on its successful solution.

A definite amount of work has been performed at Moscow enterprises in recent years to improve product quality. As a result there has been a doubling of the rate of renewal of manufactured articles and an increase in the manufacture of products of the top-quality category. The State Sign of Quality has been conferred on 4,000 articles.

However, there is still much work to be done to resolve the problem of an increase in the engineering standard and quality of products. The proportion of products of the top-quality category is growing only slowly.

Justified complaints are caused by the quality of many consumer goods. A number of plants and factories is failing to devote due attention to the planned and comprehensive solution of the problems of increasing quality. This work is still frequently performed in a systems-divorced manner and is not reflected in long-term and current production plans. Plant standardization and certification of components and assemblies and engineering operations are being introduced feebly.

The attention of the party organizations, managers, and production collectives should be concentrated on an all-around improvement in product quality. The gorkom has determined upon measures to improve this work. With the participation of ministries and departments, many enterprises have elaborated measures to increase product quality in the 10th Five-Year Plan.

The achievement of the charted goals demands a search for effective paths for the solution of this problem and further sophistication of organizing and economic activity. We must strive to insure that each enterprise organize the manufacture of products of the top-quality category in the current five-year plan and that there be an unswerving increase in its share of the overall production volume.

It is essential to adopt measures to accelerate the renewal of manufactured articles and to arrange for the production and manufacture of new products only of the top-quality category. The solution of this task is of particular significance for enterprises manufacturing the means of production. Now, under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, when equipment obsolescence is considerably more rapid than physical depreciation, there must be an unswerving reduction in the time taken for its mass and series production and the speedier assimilation of new models.

There is important significance in an improvement in the planning of product quality, which should be an inalienable part of the production management mechanism at each enterprise. An effective struggle to improve product quality cannot be organized without knowledge of the long term and specific tasks.

An increase in product quality is a multi-aspectual problem requiring the solution of a broad circle of organizational, engineering, and educational problems, and this poses the task of the elaboration and introduction at the plants and factories of comprehensive quality-control systems. The experience of the foremost enterprises shows that the introduction of such systems is an effective and efficient means of insuring the high quality of the articles and an improvement in the plants' and factories' economic activity indicators. It is essential to decisively step up this work at each enterprise.

It is essential that the party and trade union organizations and plant and factory managers create in the collective an atmosphere for creative labor and increase each worker's responsibility for the manufacture of high-quality products and for the attainment of the highest quality indicators in each job.

In increasing the efficiency of production and work quality there is important significance in a further improvement in economic work, V. V. Grishin continued. The significance of this work is growing particularly now, in the period of intensification of the development of our industry through

intensive factors and when the results of plant and factory activity will depend to an increasing extent on economic analysis and well organized current and long-term planning.

There are many shortcomings in this work. At many enterprises measures to improve production and raise its engineering level are not backed up by substantiated economic calculation.

The task is to decisively improve economic work, bring specialists and workers into the solution of this task, and enlist the scientific establishments in this work.

An important place in increasing industrial production efficiency and product quality belongs to the scientific research organizations and design offices. The quality of the plans and elaborated designs and production engineering processes and the time taken for their introduction decisively determine the level of end industrial work results.

At the same time insufficient use is being made of the possibilities of the scientific establishments in increasing production efficiency. Certain scientific research institutes and design offices are failing to influence an increase in the level of production equipment and technology. The time taken for the development and introduction of new articles and production engineering processes is frequently unduly dragged out. Many completed developments remain unimplemented for years on end, while some find no practical application at all.

A number of scientific research institutes and design offices is failing to implement the essential measures to improve the planning and organization of scientific research. Thematic plans are shaped up without consideration of the long term and national economy requirements. The efforts of the scientific workers are frequently not concentrated on the solution of the most important scientific-technical problems and the creation of fundamentally new machinery, units, and production engineering processes permitting a substantial labor productivity growth and an increase in output's quality level.

Together with further sophistication of the activity of the scientific research and design organizations, much in the acceleration of the rate of scientific-technical progress also depends on the industrial enterprises. Practice shows that at enterprises where due attention is paid to these questions, everything that is new and advanced finds the speediest application. And the scientific research institutes have a great desire to cooperate with such enterprises. At the same time it is not everywhere that this work is being performed at the proper level. Many industrial enterprises have still not worked out a comprehensive approach to the solution of the tasks of scientific-technical progress, have frequently not determined the prospects of further production development, and take a long time to introduce new designs and production engineering processes.

The task of the managers and party organizations of the enterprises, scientific research institutes, and design offices is to constantly strive for the organic combination of science and production, an increase in the quality and technical standard of developments, and the accelerated introduction in practice of completed developments.

There is important significance for the successful fulfillment of plans and increased production efficiency and work quality in the further development of socialist competition.

The capital's enterprises have accumulated great experience of the organization of socialist competition, and the collectives' efforts are being geared toward a further increase in labor productivity, the saving of raw and semi-finished material resources, the increased manufacture and upgraded quality of output, and a strengthening of labor and production discipline.

The Muscovites' labor activeness and creative attitude toward the solution of economic tasks were appraised highly by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his greetings to the capital's production frontrunners and innovators and the initiators of socialist competition for a worthy greeting of the Great October jubilee and the ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the five-year plan targets. These greetings have stirred a new surge of energy in the broad working people's masses. Currently more than 400,000 production workers and 9,000 brigades, sectors, shops, and shifts have adopted pledges to complete the targets of 2 years of the five-year plan and more by 7 November 1977.

But there are still many shortcomings in the organization of socialist competition. The party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and managers must devote more attention to the development and improvement of socialist competition and the movement for a communist attitude toward labor, direct the competition participants' efforts toward the fuller use of internal reserves, and strive on this basis for the successful completion of the 10th Five-Year Plan targets and increased efficiency and work quality.

Particular attention must be paid to disseminating the experience of the foremost plants and factories geared toward increasing production efficiency and product quality and accelerating scientific-technical progress.

The Moscow working people are aspiring to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Great October with new labor achievements. All production collectives have adopted high socialist pledges geared toward an all-around increase in production efficiency and work quality and the ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the plans of 1977 and the 10th Five-Year Plan. Work has been initiated at the enterprises to make the plants and factories model plants and factories and Moscow as a whole a model communist city.

This conference has summarized the experience of work that has been accumulated at enterprises and in organizations of the city in the sphere of

increasing production efficiency and work quality. It is now essential to initiate work to implement the conference's recommendations.

The entire practical activity of the party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, managers, and industrial enterprise, scientific research institute, and design office collectives, V. V. Grishin said in conclusion, should be subordinated to the main goal--insuring fulfillment of the task set by the 25th CPSU Congress with respect to increasing production efficiency and work quality, successfully completing all targets of the 10th Five-Year Plan, and thereby making a new contribution to the creation of communism's material-technical base.

Having comprehensively examined accumulated experience and the available reserves and possibilities of a further increase in production efficiency and work quality, the participants in the city scientific-practical conference unanimously adopted recommendations. These express the confidence that the workers, engineering-technical personnel, and employees of the capital's industrial enterprises will, under the leadership of the party organizations, do everything necessary for the successful fulfillment of the designs of the 25th CPSU Congress and the ahead-of-schedule completion of the 10th Five-Year Plan.

8850

CSO: 1800

NOVOSTI OBSERVER LAUDS SEATO DISMEMBERMENT

Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 5 Jul 77 p 3

[Article by A. Lavrent'ev, a political commentator for Novosti Press Agency: "The Command of the Times; On the Official Closing of SEATO"]

[Text] At the very end of June the aggressive block SEATO drew its last breath and sank into oblivion. The funeral for this survival of the ice age of the beginning of the "cold war" was quiet. This is understandable. The neo-colonialist tool of the West which had most obviously discredited itself has passed from the military-political arena.

It is true that Washington, which gave birth to this monster in Southeast Asia almost 23 years ago, is trying today to present its offspring in the role of some sort of inoffensive scamp. But the facts show that this "scamp" started stealing from the earliest age. Just two years after its baptism in Manila armed provocations were undertaken from the military bases of the bloc erected on the territory of the Philippines against Indonesia, which at that time decisively rejected the neo-colonialist pretensions of the West. SEATO's military bases in Thailand and South Vietnam were employed for far from plausible goals. They all were not only jumping-off points for aggressive actions against Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, but also fulfilled the role of outposts for the "fire brigades" of the militarists of the West. The atomic aircraft carrier Enterprise, for example, on numerous occasions left its base Subic Bay in the Philippines and threateningly rattled its sabre in the coastal waters of the Indian Ocean when a crisis situation arose there. The gun barrels of the aircraft carrier and its escort ships looked especially sinister when they were in the Bay of Bengal during the struggle of the people of Bangladesh for independence.

The visit to the Persian Gulf of the aircraft carrier Constellation at the height of the oil crisis when Washington was openly threatening to occupy the oil-producing regions of the Arab countries looked like unceremonious truncheon waving.

One must refer the aggression in Indochina to the very darkest page in the history of SEATO. In the mid-sixties the then President Johnson of the USA used the SEATO treaty as a pretext for sending a half million American soldiers to Vietnam. He insisted that several other countries which had entered into the bloc also send their forces to Indochina. Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines gave in to Washington's pressure. Their military units ended up in Vietnam.

Almost two million Vietnamese and more than 50,000 Americans were victims of the escapade undertaken under the banner of SEATO. Can one cross off these human lives and this incalculable destruction for the sake of a good obituary for SEATO?

As is well known, SEATO failed to fulfill the task set for it by the most conservative neo-colonialist circles of the West. The bloc was in no condition to hold back the force of the liberation movement in Asia. But the spoiler turned out to be helpless to fulfill the task planned by Washington not because it was conceived as a herbivorous animal, but because its teeth had been knocked out.

Have the adventure lovers quieted down after their shameful defeat in Indochina? No, imperialism would cease to be imperialism if it renounced expansion and exploitation of other peoples and their natural wealth. After the short-lived shock Washington undertook new steps in Asia directed toward galvanizing the old military-political organizations such as ANZUS and CENTO, tacking together new groups, and modernizing military bases like Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

In December 1975 the so-called "new Pacific doctrine" of the USA was proclaimed, having as its goal the strengthening of the American military presence in the area of the junction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the uniting under the banner of the West of apologists for imperialism.

Now when SEATO is ceasing its existence, the American magazine NEWSWEEK wrote recently, the United States plans to turn its attention to ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. The most open pressure on this cultural-economic organization of the countries of Southeast Asia was undertaken by Washington in the course of last year's meeting of leaders of the Association which took place on the island of Bali. The

presidents of Indonesia and the Philippines and the prime ministers of Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore held out at that time and announced their intention to struggle to transform the region into a zone of peace, progress, and neutrality.

However, despite the Bali declaration, the military cooperation of the countries which are members of ASEAN is still developing. Two-party and three-party military manoeuvres are conducted, and there have been seminars on military problems with the participation of army officers from all the member countries of the Association, as occurred in Djakarta in February and in Bali at the end of May. Efforts directed toward standardizing weapons are taking concrete forms.

All these and many other facts show that ASEAN, under pressure from Washington, is on a course practically leading to the formation of a military bloc.

But do the advocates of the militarization of ASEAN take into account the consequences of such a dangerous course?

The sad experience of SEATO shows that the member countries of such a bloc can be drawn into unpleasant situations and even military conflicts against their will. Moreover a regional counterbalance will hardly be able to halt an armored car if it follows a militaristic course. All the more so since behind the wheel of such a car there usually are people who unconditionally fulfill someone else's will. The sensible leaders of Asia understand this. A military bloc, said the president of Indonesia Suharto in this connection, is unthinkable without some form of participation by the USA. And this circumstance, in his opinion, will automatically bring about an increase in the USA's military presence in Southeast Asia with all the consequences resulting from that.

Today, when detente is becoming a dominant factor in the world, when the relations of states with different social structures are firmly set on a course of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation, a policy of military blocs and bases looks especially unattractive.

The peoples of Asia and of all the countries of the Third World are convinced that military blocs and bases, as the Indian newspaper PATRIOT recently wrote, are aimed at preventing the young developing governments from following an independent political course. And not only a political course. The Syrian newspaper AL BAITH writes that it is well known that since 1973 the United States is trying to surround the Arab oil sources with a military belt. The American military

bases on the island of Diego Garcia, the magazine IRAQ TODAY emphasizes, create a real threat to the future of the Arab world and to the Asian and African states of the Indian Ocean basin. All the unaligned countries manifest great anxiety in this regard.

The Soviet public shares the anxiety of the peoples of the developing countries and supports their just demands for the liquidation of the West's military blocs fraught with threats to their sovereign development. Together with the Third World it believes that the realization of this demand would correspond to the spirit of the times and to the expectations of all peoples.

8542

CSO: 1800

PROSECUTOR CITES JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROBLEMS

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 28, 13 Jul 77 p 12

[Article by S. Gusev, deputy USSR prosecutor general, state counselor of justice first class: "The Law and the Juvenile"]

[Text] Among the basic tenets of state and social life of the country, the draft of the new USSR constitution includes concern for communist upbringing, spiritual and physical development of the youth.

It is well known that protection of the moral health of the rising generation has been at the center of attention of party and state from the first days of the establishment of the Soviet power, and we think it would be useful to bring to mind today a number of very interesting historical facts. Lenin's Decree on the Establishment of a Council for the Protection of Children was issued on 4 February 1919. It was aimed at improving the conditions of life of children and juveniles who found themselves in difficult straits. Under the difficult conditions of the civil war and the postwar dislocation, the Soviet state implemented large-scale social measures providing for the effective protection of youth from harmful influences. In 1923 more than a million orphaned children received state assistance. Parents' rights were regulated on a new basis: according to D.I. Kurskiy's happy definition "not as rights over a child, but as rights in the name of the child, in defense of the child." Principles of humanism, humanity became determinative in the whole policy applying to juveniles, especially in regard to the "difficult" ones. The efforts of F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, N.K. Krupskaya, the outstanding pedagog A.S. Makarenko resulted in the formulation of an original pedagogic conception of preventive activity: the homeless were not "morally defective," but, as a rule, normal children in an abnormal situation; their conditions of life had to be changed. To the extent that the conditions of life were changed, crime among minors was reduced. Today it is significantly lower than 20-30 years ago. (It is of interest to point out also that crime among minors in the USSR is several times smaller than in the United States and in most of the European capitalist countries.)

The complete eradication of violations of law among the youth is a task of major significance, the successful resolution of which requires the joint efforts of state and public organizations.

The importance of this problem is understood by everyone today, but unfortunately when it comes to the specific juvenile, timely measures are not always and everywhere taken. Cases are still encountered where the fate of the juvenile, who has come under a bad influence, is not dealt with either by public opinion or by those organs which should be taking immediate preventive measures.

The upbringing of children is significantly affected by the presence of so-called unhappy families in which the parents shirk their parental duties and maintain an antisocial way of life, get drunk. In dealing with this evil, the efforts of health-care organs and those of guardians, public organizations, collectives of workers, the militia, the courts, the procuracy should be combined.

But the problem of family upbringing is by no means limited by this. It happens sometimes that parents appear to everybody to be good at work and at home and want sincerely the happiness of their children and have the intention of giving them the best bringing up. But... it does not work out that way. It takes ability to bring up children, and this gift is not possessed by everyone, and instinct does not replace knowledge. Especially knowledge of pedagogy. Here are the results of scientific studies of families where law violators were growing up. It was found that almost 70 percent of the parents were unable to bring up their children properly in the absence of elementary pedagogic competence! "Unable" is no less dangerous than "did not want to." If this is combined with a low educational and cultural level possessed by the adults, the results are even more depressing. (According to another study, in families where parents have secondary or higher education, there are half as many children violating the law compared to families with parents with a primary education.)

The need is urgent to give more attention to the pedagogic education of the parents.

In the draft of the new Constitution, it states: "USSR citizens are under the obligation to look after the bringing up of children, preparing them for socially useful labor, having them become worthy members of socialist society." Real fulfillment of this primary responsibility requires educational ability.

The draft of the new Constitution provides as one of the objectives of the Soviet state expansion of real opportunities for the development and use by citizens of their creative powers, capacities and talents for the all-round development of the individual.

One such real opportunity is the possibility and to a considerable extent a duty for each juvenile to obtain a secondary education. For various reasons this is at present not possible for everyone. This is a subject with many levels and is an object of special study; I would only like to touch upon one aspect of it.

Every year throughout the country a considerable number of pupils leave general educational school before completion of eighth-year classes. Furthermore, many juveniles transfer to schools for working and rural youth ostensibly to continue their education. In many cases this is done in violation of the law without the consent of the commission for affairs of minors. Actually we are dealing with a surreptitious form of elimination of "difficult" juveniles lowering progress indicators. This is frequently accompanied by hypocrisy. The juveniles, their parents, teachers and members of the commissions for affairs of minors give the impression, and seemingly believe, that the desire not to study in day school will be replaced in the twinkling of an eye by the desire to study in night school. But there are no miracles--and the number of those who quit evening schools is more than three times higher than the number of second-year pupils, of which, by the way, there are also many. Among these and others there are many youngsters under fifteen years of age who, according to the law, should not be allowed to get a job.

Incidentally, when there is no possibility of camouflaging the desire to get rid of a slack pupil, it then may happen that it is not camouflaged.

The director of the Lyubar Boarding School, G. Prokopenko, sent a ten-year-old boy for his parents, and when they failed to appear, he turned over to the pupil his personal records and told him to go to the four winds. Some time later, the boy, being unsupervised, was picked up by workers of the militia and sent to the Zhitormi children's reception and distribution center. On the request of the prosecuting officer, the school director was strictly punished.

These things are done for the benefit of narrow departmental interests and are a form of them. But the artificial transfer of juveniles that are difficult to handle from one social statistical category to another gives nothing to society as a whole.

It is sufficient to say that the rate of crime among juveniles who are not working or studying is 24 times (!) greater than among youngsters attending school. And there is nothing surprising in this--a schoolboy, no matter what he may be, is always favorably influenced both by the teacher and his comrades. It is only necessary to raise constantly the level of individual educational work.

Sifting out of pupils, even through legal and most plausible forms, should be reduced to a minimum. It would seem that organs of public education should appraise the educational work of pedagogic collectives while taking into account the fates of their former pupils. After all, it is of no importance where a person studies or works--he is still yesterday's pupil.

In dealing with offenses of juveniles, the inculcation of respect for the law is of particular importance. We can achieve this only by raising the level of legal education rather than through strictness of a sentence. The power

of the law lies not so much in the severity of punishment as in its inevitability. With reference to youngsters, the principle of inevitability is of special importance, since a "psychology of impunity from punishment" is particularly dangerous here--it frequently contributes to the commission of repeat and frequently more aggravated crimes.

... In January 1977 the body of 16-year-old Vladimir Kovalev, an eighth-year pupil at No 8 Secondary School, was found in Nizhnekamsk of Tatarskaya ASSR.

That same day Abkaymov, E.A., 18, and Nenast'yev, A.V., 15, of the same class, were arrested on suspicion of murdering Kovalev.

As a result of the investigation of the case, it was learned that Nenast'yev and Abkayumov had been on the roster of the children's room of the militia for vagrancy since December 1975. In September 1976 an application was received at the children's room of the militia to remove Abkayumov and Nenast'yev from the roster as having reformed. Nenast'yev failed to sleep for several nights at his home and for this reason was not removed from the roster.

On 11 January 1977 Abkayumov and Nenast'yev beat up Kovalev. The latter told about this to his mother, who submitted a statement to the school and to the children's room of the militia.

A. Uzanova, the children's room inspector, obtained a testimony from Kovalev. Testimonies were also obtained from Abkayumov and Nenast'yev, who promised to leave Kovalev alone henceforth. Several days later Abkayumov and Nenast'yev drank up a bottle of wine and then killed him with special brutality.

In the USSR Prosecuting Attorney's Office, there is now under investigation the case of a particularly brutal murder of a female pupil of the 9th-year class, Lesya K. Trup. Lesya's body was found with numerous hack, stab and slash wounds in her apartment.

This tragedy, instantly surrounded with fantastic rumors and conjectures, had been preceded by truly "enigmatic" occurrences.

For several months, Lesya's apartment had been receiving continually telephone calls from unknown persons who called themselves "plebeian wreckers." A person, on lifting the receiver, would be subjected to insults and hear absurd and senseless (so it seemed at the time) threats. The girl's upset parents turned to the militia in regard to this. How could one not be upset? What enemies could a respectable family have which never came into conflict either with neighbors or with coworkers? It is true that the "plebeians" twice displayed their ability for physical damage: once they set fire to the door's padding and then sometime later cut it up with a knife. Nonetheless no one took them seriously. On recognizing the voice, they were even asked: "Tell me, are you the plebeians?"

Despite all these "mysterious" circumstances, toward evening following commission of the murder, the guilty persons gave testimony to the investigating officer of the prosecuting attorney's office. There was nothing demoniac about them. They were ordinary eighth-year students: one did worse in his studies, the other did better; one was interested in pyrotechnics, the other in chemistry; both were from families that could not be called unhappy in the customary sense of the word; but the main thing is that both had never been known for pathologic or simply "plain" cruelty.

The murder had been committed for purposes of revenge (the girl had stopped being in their company). They had thought out the crime carefully, prepared for it over a long time, worked out various variants and details including putting the dog to sleep that belonged to this family. Here (as in the first case) impunity from punishment led to hooliganism and then to the grievous crime of murder.

A great deal has to be known for correct, scientifically organized activity relative to the prevention of crime by juveniles. The first is how do the social environment, education and upbringing influence the formation of their intellectual and personal qualities. How is it that some normal juveniles' personalities become established without the influence of family, school, worker collective? It is well known to everyone that a juvenile is no longer a child, but is still not an adult; what does the particular make-up of this stage of psychic development consist of? It is frequently accompanied by strong emotional experiences, disharmony of different sides of the personality and various deviations in the emotional-volitional sphere.

These questions can be elucidated, investigated by a forensic-psychological examination which we try to prescribe in especially difficult cases. Unfortunately, the possibilities of investigative organs are limited here. And this is not because of inadequate investigation of the many problems in the psychology of a juvenile and pertinent aspects of social psychology. Frequently it is simply because there are not enough psychologists-specialists.

We want to solve this question in the near future.

Once you refer to the emotional experiences of the juvenile, you cannot but help mention that extremely many offenders have never been to a theater, circus, philharmonic orchestra. This applies not only to rural inhabitants but also to born-and-bred city dwellers. But the introduction of youngsters to the treasures of world culture is just as necessary as their learning of the alphabet and arithmetic. Who knows--quite possibly a potential rapist, on seeing "Romeo and Juliet," might not become a rapist... "Man's Fate" has fully the capacity to oblige one to think of his own fate...

It would seem that all "adult" theaters should think of expanding their repertoire of plays so as to include those for juveniles.

The theater and cinema could become a major school not only for moral, esthetic, but also for legal education of the youth. This would call for raising the requirements of the "legal aspects" of those works which depict the struggle against crime. Frequently, for the benefit of their subject, authors show that which could not possibly be.

Recently there appeared on the country's screens an artistic film "Dlinnoye, Dlinnoye Delo..." [The Long, Long Case...], which already has drawn justified criticism in the press. Without going into an evaluation of the artistic merits of this picture, it is necessary to point out permitted legal errors.

An investigative officer of a rayon prosecuting attorney's office goes at night to the place of a murder. Then, not seeing the alleged murderer and, naturally, not interrogating, he compiles in absentia (!) a decision for his arrest and goes in the morning to get the approval of the prosecuting attorney, who does not even attempt to get at the essence of the case and approves the arrest. The authors of the film, to put it mildly, have their heroes commit manifest violations of legal norms.

The same thing may be said about a film recently shown on the television first program; in the film, the last in the series "Sledstviye Vedut Znatoki" [An Investigation Is Conducted by Experts], a false confession is not checked out and the investigating officer irresponsibly frees the murderer, although there is no basis for this. An investigative officer of organs of internal affairs, Znamenskiy, investigates the circumstances of a murder despite the fact that in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code such crimes are investigated by the prosecuting attorney's office. Expert Kibrit comes to a conclusion on the method of the murder, which is the responsibility of the actual investigating officer.

As a result, the viewer is misled: it would seem that it is possible without special labor to evade responsibility for a murder following its commission and ostensibly have an innocent person punished for it. The prestige of this series of television broadcasts suffers thereby.

I have touched upon only a few aspects of this many-level problem of the struggle against violations of the law by minors. The party, as Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said in his report on the draft of the USSR Constitution, expects more initiative, adherence to principles, irreconcilability in the struggle against any violations of Soviet law and order. The draft of the Fundamental Law places on the prosecuting attorney's office the responsibility for the "highest surveillance over exact and uniform fulfillment of laws." An inseparable and important part of this highest surveillance is ensuring strict fulfillment of the laws on the education, protection of morals, struggle against neglect and violations of the law among minors.

FDR-CHURCHILL SECRET WARTIME CORRESPONDENCE REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 6,
Jun 77 signed to press 19 May 77 pp 131-137

[Review by Ernst Henry of the book "Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence," ed by F. L. Loewenheim, H. D. Langley and M. Jonas, London, Barrie and Jenkins, 1975, 805 pages]

[Text] I

During World War II, the heads of the American and English governments exchanged top secret messages regularly, sometimes daily. The paper on which these messages were written yellowed long ago: More than 3 decades have gone by since that time. Both of the correspondents are dead. The world is a different place now. Much has changed almost beyond recognition. But does this mean that the wartime correspondence of the two Western leaders can only interest historians?

After reading the secret messages, the reader will definitely say that this is not true. It is true that much of the correspondence concerns only the past. F. D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill exchanged opinions on current military operations and discussed certain strategic matters. But there are parts--perhaps the main parts for the modern reader--of the correspondence which sound quite applicable to the present. These parts should be discussed first.

No great surprises will be found in the book. There will be no need to rewrite history. The basic facts were more or less known before, and some other facts were presupposed. Nonetheless, the fact that the events of those years are being discussed by such top-level statesmen as Roosevelt and Churchill, and are being discussed frankly, in private, by men who did not expect the correspondence to ever be made public, makes the situation depicted for the reader doubly interesting.

We know how much the course of the war and the fate of the capitalist world depended at that time on the President of the United States and the British prime minister. We also know that, after these two statesmen, neither the

American nor the English bourgeoisie had other politicians of comparable caliber or influence. Capitalism is giving birth to truly great statesmen less and less frequently during the days of its historic decline. This also underscores the significance of the testimony of these two individuals. There was no one with more authority or knowledge at that time in the West.

The book contains more than 1,700 messages--around 1,000 from Churchill and more than 700 from Roosevelt. These messages span the period from 11 September 1939, 8 days after the beginning of World War II, to 11 April 1945, the day before Roosevelt's death. The editors point out the fact that the substance of the correspondence was known to only a handful of the closest advisers of the two correspondents. Copies of the messages are now kept in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in New York. The editors themselves are prominent American historians who are close to the State Department.

Not all of the correspondence has been published, but there is quite enough to form a definite opinion on the most important issues. In general, we can say that Roosevelt and Churchill, in this secret correspondence, confirm the views of Soviet scholars on some of the major World War II issues.

Above all, the following question arises. Did the heads of the two leading Western powers really want only a victory over Hitler at that time? Were their actions and plans always limited to only this goal? Did they also have other plans?

The documents provide an indisputable answer to these questions. Above all, they are touched upon by Churchill, but not only by him. During the war years, neither Churchill nor Roosevelt was concerned only with national interests; both men were also thinking about the class interests of the bourgeoisie that had advanced them to a position of power. This is made obvious on almost every page of the book.

Here is another significant fact. The documents just as precisely confirm the existence of two major schools of bourgeois diplomacy in our time. Looking back, we can, by stretching the point only slightly, call them the Churchill School and the Roosevelt School. Both men represented the same class--the monopolistic bourgeoisie. Both schools belong to the imperialist camp. But there was one significant difference between them: One was absolutely incapable of imagining anything but acute international tension, while the other, under certain conditions, was capable of understanding the need for peaceful coexistence by the two systems.

Today, this difference is apparent to the naked eye. During the war, however, the battle between the two schools of bourgeois diplomacy took place, as the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence demonstrates, mainly behind the scenes.

No historian can say that Churchill was not a gifted bourgeois politician. He knew more about international affairs than any of the prime ministers of

England who had preceded him during the last hundred years. Because he was also well versed in military matters and was extraordinarily energetic, Churchill was able to make bold and enterprising decisions at moments of crisis, without retreating in the face of danger. The words he addressed to the English people in the House of Commons on 13 May 1940 after his appointment as prime minister have become famous: "I offer nothing but blood, hard labor, tears and sweat." It was his ability for decisive military leadership that caused the Conservative Party to make him the head of the government instead of the talentless man from Munich, Neville Chamberlain, on the eve of the Dunkirk catastrophe.

This time, however, even Churchill was stunned. This old English reactionary who had gone through fire and water did not understand the main thing about the 1940's: the spirit of the times. In his attempt to win World War II for England in the same way that the first war had been won, Churchill did not realize that socialism had become the major force of the 20th century. This error was unforgivable for a modern politician and it became Churchill's fatal error.

From 1941 on, when the USSR, the United States and England became partners in the anti-Hitler coalition, Churchill constantly played a two-faced game with the Soviet Union. While his public statements were filled with praise for the unparalleled success of the Soviet Army and the heroism of the Soviet people, he was constantly plotting against the USSR. This is made quite apparent in several of his messages to Roosevelt. Some telegrams bristle with anti-Soviet attacks, suspicions and proposals that the U.S. President enter a secret conspiracy against the ally of England and the United States. Now and then, Churchill returned to this subject, although he knew better than anyone else that England had been saved by the Soviet Union from ruin at the beginning of the 1940's.

Some statements of this kind by Churchill in regard to certain important matters which arose during the course of military operations are cited below. Here it will be enough to cite just one of his secret telegrams to Roosevelt, sent at the end of the war, when Churchill seemed to be summing up his previous "warnings" about this and his plans for the future.

In reference to England's and the United States' relations with the USSR, Churchill wrote the following to Roosevelt on 5 April 1945, a month before Soviet troops, contrary to the expectations of the British prime minister, took Berlin and a week before they entered Vienna:

"I deem it of the highest importance that a firm and blunt stand should be made at this juncture by our two countries.... I believe that this is the best chance of saving the future." Otherwise, Churchill continued, "I should despair of our future relations with them" (the Soviet Union--E. H.) (p 705).

Is it not true that these words sound like something that might be said not during the 1940's, but during the 1970's by some of those who are now shouting about the urgent need to save the West from the "Soviet menace"?

These were Churchill's views throughout the war years. He did not change them under any circumstances--neither during times of difficulty nor at the moment when victory was already near. As a representative of old British imperialism at the time of its decline and as a man whose thoughts were essentially governed by the beliefs of the era when this imperialism considered itself to be omnipotent and omniscient, Churchill felt that he would ultimately somehow be able to take the fruits of the victory over fascism away from the Soviet Union. When he realized that he had failed, Churchill immediately became the herald of uncompromising cold war. In this respect, he remained true to himself to the end. In March 1946, as we know, he made a speech in Fulton, openly calling upon England and the United States to wage a preventive war against the USSR.

Roosevelt was a completely different kind of man, a more complex and contradictory person, both as an individual and as a politician. In his correspondence with Churchill, the U.S. President appears to be a much more farsighted and shrewd statesman than the prime minister of England. In any case, he cannot be measured against Churchill. Churchill's messages sometimes sound like glib journalistic articles. Roosevelt's messages were calmer and drier and his ideas were more realistic.

Naturally, Roosevelt the politician had different historical roots and he himself had different tendencies, a different train of thought and a different character. As the head of the most powerful capitalist state in the world, he also conducted a class policy, but, although he remained a bourgeois statesman, he was more farsighted and more knowledgeable about historical conditions than his London correspondent.

In contrast to Churchill, Roosevelt realized that he was living in the 20th century and not the 19th. He evidently realized that the socialist power represented a strong new force in world politics and that it would be impossible for imperialism to impose its will on this power, as proposed by Churchill. It is completely possible that this was partially due to the ties connecting Franklin Roosevelt--and, to an even greater degree, his closest adviser and friend, Harry Hopkins--with the traditions of the old progressive school of American bourgeois democracy, the school of Jefferson and Lincoln. Although these ties were never all that evident, they must be borne in mind.

Churchill was a confirmed conservative, but Roosevelt knew that his career depended largely on the support of the majority of average Americans. He sincerely despised fascism, which was threatening America from within as well as from outside the nation: Such organizations as America First, the German-American Bund, the Hearst newspaper chain and others did everything possible during the war to force Roosevelt out of the presidency, almost going so far as to accuse him of high treason.

We have no reason to exaggerate his virtues. Roosevelt was just as hostile to socialist ideals as Churchill. But at least he realized that the Western

powers would not be able to survive and would not win the war without close cooperation with the Soviet Union. This was the reason for his arguments with Churchill over several issues--although, as we will see, not by any means all issues--when this cooperation was being undermined in London. At times like these, the U.S. President politely but firmly said "no" to London and tried to restrain the anti-Soviet ardor of "John Bull," as he, with undisguised irony, called Churchill. This is even pointed out by the editors of the book. "It looked as though," they write in their introduction to the book, "the President attached no deeper meaning to his nation's relationship with Britain than he did to its relationship with China and the other Allies, including the Soviet Union.... When, at Teheran, Roosevelt turned down an offer to stay at the British legation and moved into the Russian enclave (on the territory of the Soviet Embassy--E. H.); when he met privately on several occasions with Stalin but only briefly toward the end of the conference with Churchill,...the Prime Minister could not help but be further irritated by his American colleague. Differences over the launching of a second front in Europe, over the invasion of southern France, over the future regimes in Italy and Greece, and even over the areas of Germany to be occupied by Great Britain and the United States kept this irritation alive. The events at Yalta in February 1945 did little to soothe it. The President once again turned down Churchill's request for thorough military and political coordination (by England and the United States--E. H.) prior to the conference and held only a token meeting with him at Malta.... At Yalta a visibly tired Roosevelt, acting as chairman of the conference, assumed the role of mediator between Britain and Russia on global issues and made a private arrangement with Stalin about the Far East without involving Churchill at all" (p 12).

This is how the two schools of bourgeois diplomacy conflicted during World War II. The differences in their approach to events are obvious. Despite the fact that both belonged to the imperialist camp, each followed its own course--although, as we have said, not in every case. The documents of the secret correspondence confirm the fact that it was only Roosevelt's political superiority to Churchill that made the cooperation of the powers in the anti-Hitler coalition possible and, consequently, made victory possible. It is difficult to imagine what might have happened in the wartime relations between these countries if Churchill had gained the upper hand.

Churchill's arguments with Roosevelt were not limited to differences over the USSR. There were also internal imperialist conflicts at that time. For example, the editors of the book mention the following:

"From the beginning Roosevelt thought of Churchill as 'John Bull,'...crediting him with all the solidity and determination the name implies but also looking on him as something of an anachronism. On occasion he amplified this idea by referring to Churchill as an unreconstructed Tory or as the last of the Victorians. Such feelings underlay the often acrimonious discussions between the two men over the future of the British Empire, which began with the first meeting in Washington and continued, both in the correspondence and in

subsequent conferences, to the very end. The implication in Roosevelt's attitude that he, the man of the present, better understood the needs of the future than Churchill, the man of the past, led to even more serious difficulties between the two, both at Teheran and at Yalta" (p 11).

Even the leader of the American bourgeoisie could see that Churchill was living in the past. This led to real clashes. When General P. J. Hurley, Roosevelt's personal representative in the Near East, reported to his chief in the spring of 1943 that England planned to acquire a "zone of influence" in Iran and Roosevelt sent this report on to London, the enraged Churchill wrote the following to Roosevelt on 21 May 1944:

"The general seems to have some ideas about British imperialism which I confess make me rub my eyes. He makes out, for example, that there is an irrepressible conflict between imperialism and democracy. I make bold, however, to suggest that British imperialism has spread and is spreading democracy more widely than any other system of government since the beginning of time" (p 499).

Churchill actually did feel that the British Empire was the height of mankind's aspirations. To the American imperialists, on the other hand, this empire already appeared to be a relatively easy conquest. In this case, reference was primarily being made to oil, and this was perfectly understood by both sides.

This was not all. During the war, Roosevelt openly and persistently demanded that England give up the principle of imperial preference--something that the British Empire is still hanging on to now. Roosevelt felt that the American lease-lend offered to England during the war would compensate for this! Shylock's price all over again. On 7 February 1942, Churchill angrily replied: "The great majority of the Cabinet (English--E. H.) felt that if we bartered the principle of imperial preference for the sake of lease-lend we should have accepted an intervention in the domestic affairs of the British Empire" (p 176).

This was more than a simple difference of opinion--it could be called a real clash. Disputes of this kind also arose over the future of India and the division of international air lines (p 74). At first, Roosevelt even refused to tell England about the atomic bomb being developed in the United States at that time (p 33).

The internal imperialist conflicts between England and the United States indisputably played an important role then. But the main argument was over cooperation with the Soviet Union. Churchill was aggravating relations with Moscow and Roosevelt was trying to make them smoother. But not always. The political realism of the American President did not go far.

In reference to the arguments between London and Washington, the editors of the book write: "But these were the quarrels of partners; the reality of

the Atlantic alliance was never in doubt" (p 41). In other words, whenever matters concerned the fundamental class interests of both sides, the capitalist front was solid. Class considerations always outweighed imperialist rivalry.

Naturally, there is nothing amazing in this. In Roosevelt's messages, as we will see, it is easy to find indications of his anxiety over the growing power and prestige of the Soviet Union. This anxiety increased in Washington as the end of the war and victory drew near. On 17 March 1945, a little more than a month after the conference in Yalta, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill: "Our friendship is the rock on which I build for the future of the world so long as I am one of the builders" (p 13).

On 10 April 1945 (2 days before his death), Roosevelt apparently had a pre-vision of the postwar conference of the allies and sent a wire to London: "I shall, of course, take no action of any kind, nor make any statement, without consulting you, and I know you will do the same" (p 707).

In other words, there was to be a conspiracy against the USSR. Roosevelt himself did not have to abide by his promises. As we know, after the war, the United States, believing that it had a monopoly on atomic weapons, took a sharp turn toward cold war. Roosevelt's successor, Truman, even outdid Churchill by setting himself the goal of establishing American world supremacy. Although Churchill himself was almost immediately cast off by the people of his own nation after the war, his ideas triumphed abroad. American bourgeois politicians who regarded themselves as the heirs to Jefferson and Lincoln were forced out of the political arena and the ideal of peaceful coexistence was anathematized.*

Nonetheless, the things Roosevelt did during the war to promote this ideal will live in history and are of great importance today.

II

The characters of Roosevelt and Churchill can be quite precisely determined from their correspondence. It is also interesting to learn the details of the way in which they conducted their policies during different periods of the war.

It is absolutely clear that Churchill played his game against the Soviet Union literally day after day, trying to outsmart the Americans as well as the Soviets in this process. Everything in London was aimed at this goal. The book, edited by American historians close to the State Department,

* It is indicative that American reactionaries were already taking Churchill's side against Roosevelt during the war and are still occupying this position today. Some of Roosevelt's critics, the editors say, believed "that the President ought to have listened more carefully to Churchill's hardheaded advice about the menace of Russian communism" (p 47).

provides many bits of documented evidence of this. During the first phase of the war, in 1941-1942, Soviet troops withstood the attacks of Hitler's armies with titanic energy. It was time to ask when the USSR's allies would launch the second front in France--in accordance with the fundamental agreement. There was a constant exchange of opinions in regard to this matter by the USSR, England and the United States. London took a particularly uncompromising stand.

At the time of Churchill's first meeting with Roosevelt in August 1941, the editors state, "the British contended that Nazi Germany would be defeated without a landing on the Continent, and that continued blockading, heavy bombing, and skilled propaganda would destroy the Germans' will to fight.... Marshall (a general and the U.S. Army chief of staff during the war and Roosevelt's closest military adviser--E. H.) strongly disagreed with this position" (p 154).

A year later, Churchill sent a wire to Washington on 8 June 1942: "No responsible British general, admiral, or air marshal is prepared to recommend Sledgehammer (the code name for the second front in France--E. H.) as a practical operation in 1942" (p 222).

He sent another wire on 13 August 1942: "We will pay our way by bombing Germany" (p 235). In other words, he would do anything but launch a second front in France. Churchill essentially wanted the Soviet Union to exhaust its forces in a one-to-one land battle with the Germans.

In 1943, Churchill, resorting to all sorts of reservations, continued to occupy the same position in regard to the landing in France. Roosevelt agreed with Churchill in a letter to Stalin on 20 June, but he had already sent J. E. Davies, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, to Moscow to assure the Soviet Government that differences could be resolved (p 341). Roosevelt and Stalin planned to meet to discuss the second front. At first, Churchill tried to "prevent" it (p 348). Later, on 23 October 1943, he wrote to Roosevelt: "Nor do I think we ought to meet Stalin, if ever the meeting can be arranged, without being agreed about Anglo-American operations as such" (p 387).

When the meeting with Stalin was set for December 1943 in Teheran, Churchill, the editors report, "insisted on a prior conference with Roosevelt at Cairo so that the Anglo-American partners could coordinate policy and present a united front. But Roosevelt did not want such an arrangement." Instead, he invited Soviet representatives to Cairo, "hoping in this way to disassociate himself from Churchill and the British sufficiently to gain a freer hand with Stalin" (pp 11-12, 393).

Churchill's references to the purely military reasons that allegedly necessitated the postponement of the Normandy landing were not seconded by Washington. Marshall's and Roosevelt's conclusions about the second front eventually led to a number of "decisions that were unpopular with Churchill" (p 26).

The fact that Churchill's postponement of the launching of the second front in France was an attempt to control Roosevelt as well as Stalin was always known, but now it has been confirmed by his own testimony. He did not care that all of this could come to the surface some day. Such things are common in history.

During the last stage of the war, the summer of 1944, the situation changed dramatically, for Churchill as well. The second front was finally launched and Soviet troops steadily advanced on Germany from the east while Anglo-American troops advanced from the west. Hitlerism would collapse within the year. From this time on, Churchill had only one thing in mind: to push the Anglo-American, particularly the English, armies "as far east as possible" (this phrase was constantly repeated by him in secret at this time), for the purpose of blocking the Soviet troops' way into central and southeast Europe. While he had previously slowed down the advance of the Western allies, now he was forcing it, still with the same goal: to take the fruits of victory away from the Soviet Union.

We must remember that Churchill had his own plan for the "second front" at first. He felt that the main attack should not come from France, but from the south of Europe, through Italy and the Balkans. Here, England would be served by its strong Mediterranean fleet and Montgomery's army in North Africa. Besides this, the Wehrmacht forces were much weaker here than in the north of the Continent. But for Churchill, the main thing was not this, but his plan for the allied troops to seize the initiative from the Soviet Army while they were marching through Italy and the Balkans and to block this army's entry into Western Europe.

As early as the fall of 1941, Churchill was planning a landing in Italy, to, in his words, "open up the only possible 'second front' in Europe within our power while we were alone in the West" (p 161). After the landing in Sicily in July 1943, he again spoke of "using Italy as a springboard for probes into the Balkans" (p 32), although Washington was already insisting on a landing in Normandy (p 31). Three months later, on 7 October 1943, when Soviet troops had already crossed the Dnepr and were moving toward the Balkans, Churchill sent a wire to Roosevelt:

"I believe it will be found that the Italian and Balkan peninsulas are militarily and politically united and that really it is one theatre with which we have to deal" (p 370).

Full speed ahead to the Balkans! Churchill already had his proteges throughout this region: King Peter in Yugoslavia, King George in Greece and King Michael in Romania. The same kind of role was to be played by Marshal Badoglio in Italy and by Benes and Mikolajczyk, then living in England, farther north, in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Churchill knew quite well that a decisive blow could be dealt to the Wehrmacht from France, and not from this side. But his interests lay elsewhere.

After pushing into the "Po Valley (in northern Italy--E. H.), past Trieste and the Ljubljana gap in Yugoslavia," he expected to overtake the Soviet Army, and not only in the Balkans. "Churchill's objective was always," the editors stress, "to meet the Russian forces as far east as possible and to see Vienna liberated by British rather than Russian troops" (p 509). Later, at his second meeting with Roosevelt in Quebec in September 1944, Churchill openly declared that "he preferred to get into Vienna before the Russians did" (p 574).

It is interesting that Roosevelt was not in complete agreement with Churchill in this case either. On 30 July 1943, he sent a wire to London: "I believe that in any important negotiations affecting the Balkans the concurrence of Russia should be obtained if practicable" (p 359).

Roosevelt's advisers, General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson, felt in general that Churchill, in proposing an advance through Italy and the Balkans, was simply trying to put off the beginning of military operations in France (p 32). They were not completely correct. Churchill was also thinking about Vienna.

During the last stage of the war, when the Allies were already advancing on Germany, he began to give serious thought to Berlin as well, motivated by the same considerations. He sent a wire to Roosevelt on 1 April 1945: "I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible, and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it. This also appears sound on military grounds" (p 699).

Churchill sent another wire on 5 April 1945: "All this makes it the more important that we should join hands with the Russian armies as far to the east as possible and, if circumstances allow, enter Berlin" (pp 704-705).

Churchill insisted that the Soviet troops should enter Berlin first, in spite of the previous agreement by the three powers. He was obviously counting on the fact that the Germans would not put up any serious resistance to the Allies on the western front.*

Can we assume that the Americans always objected to Churchill's plans? The editors of the book try to convey this impression. Roosevelt, they write, "continued to resist Churchill's desire to march on to Berlin or to seize Vienna and Prague. In short, Roosevelt did not agree with Churchill's insistence that the Western Allies meet the Russians as far east as possible" (p 519). Although Churchill "exploded," Roosevelt and Marshall "stood firmly behind Eisenhower's decision to stop at the Elba" (p 39). As early as 28 March,

* Did Churchill make a secret deal with the Germans in connection with this? There is not a word about it, naturally, in the correspondence; as we have already said, however, not all of the documents have been published. The two-faced games being played by Churchill at this time leave no doubts. We know that as early as 1944 influential German generals were completely willing to open the western front to the Allies.

Eisenhower himself had sent a message to Moscow, announcing his desire to coordinate the plans of the Western and Soviet troops as to the direction and timing of their meeting in Germany (p 696). In spite of Churchill, Moscow and Washington, as we know, agreed to meet at the Elba.

Despite all of the abovementioned facts, the secret correspondence between London and Washington shows that the position occupied by the United States at the end of the war was not this cut and dried.

Roosevelt was indisputably more of a realist than Churchill, who never was able to free himself of the political beliefs of a dead era. He took a more sober view than Churchill of the possible future correlation of forces in Europe after the defeat of Hitlerism and had a clearer understanding of the growing strength of socialist ideals in the world. But even he, a representative of the "liberal" school of bourgeois democracy, began to be seized by a purely class-determined fear of the forces of socialism on the eve of Germany's surrender.

The editors of the book point out the fact that, at this time, Roosevelt "was also becoming increasingly concerned about relations with the Soviet Union." When he talked with the pretender to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Otto Hapsburg, in September 1944, he said: "Our main concern is how to keep the communists out of Hungary and Austria." The editors also cite the following notation made by Hapsburg in his memoirs: "From all of Roosevelt's remarks it is quite evident that he is afraid of the communists and wants to do everything to contain Russia's power--naturally short of war" (p 67). When Churchill announced in an almost hysterical message to Roosevelt on 5 April 1945 that "saving the future" would only be possible if a "firm and blunt stand" were made in regard to the USSR, Roosevelt replied on the following day: "I am in general agreement with your opinion...and I am pleased with your very clear strong message to Stalin" (p 705).

American imperialism began the transition to cold war while Roosevelt was still alive. In 1945-1952, Truman only completed something which had already matured in Washington before his time. This is also proved by the secret correspondence.

It is clear, however, that the two schools of bourgeois diplomacy are not identical. Both of them still exist and the differences between them have not been eradicated. Churchill has his followers, who are called "hawks" today, and Roosevelt and Hopkins have their disciples--in several new variants--who tend toward a policy of peaceful coexistence. The situation in the world of the 1970's is completely different from that of the 1940's, and the people of the world are faced by vast new problems. But the capitalist camp is basically still divided into the same groups in terms of attitudes toward the forces of socialism.

Churchill played a two-faced game with the Soviet Union from the very beginning of the war to the very end. While he was warring with Germany, he

simultaneously did everything possible behind the scenes to form a conspiracy by the Western powers against the USSR. He wrote the following to Roosevelt on 1 July 1944 in reference to European affairs and Soviet policy: "It is better to settle the matter for ourselves and between ourselves" (p 548).

Is this only a thing of the past? No, it is not. The same kind of European policy is now supported by figures in the West who advocate eternal cold war.

Churchill lost his game. This fact could not be ignored by the editors of his correspondence with Roosevelt. They cite, for example, statements by Liddell Hart, famous British military historian, who feels that Churchill was "overrated" and that his dynamism in World War II "was too strong for his statesmanship--and his strategy." American historian J. M. Burns concludes that Churchill "lacked the necessary steadiness of direction, comprehensiveness of outlook, sense of proportion and relevance" (pp 43-44).

Could these critical remarks not be applied to the "hawks" of the 1970's? And is there not a striking similarity between the position occupied by those who advocate rejection of the cold war policy in the United States today and the position occupied by Roosevelt in regard to several important issues during the war years?

The editors of the book end their introduction to the secret correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt with the following conclusion: "It may well have been true that by the outbreak of World War II the world balance of power--and the balance of ideas--had already shifted so greatly that the democracies (the Western powers--E. H.), with the help of the Soviet Union, could win the war, but that they could not win the peace." It is in this possibility, the American historians remark, that the "triumph" and the "tragedy of Roosevelt and Churchill" lie (p 76).

Obviously, they are correct. The matter, naturally, does not lie in the personalities of Churchill and Roosevelt. From the historic standpoint, their tragedy only reflects the tragedy of world capitalism.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAVDA, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1977

8588

CSO: 1800

NEW BOOK HAILS RELAXATION PROCESS, STRESSES POLITICAL COOPERATION

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 14 Apr 77 pp 139-143

[D. Tomashevskiy review of N. I. Lebedev book*: "Topical Problems of the Reorganization of International Relations"]

[Text] The dynamism of the contemporary era and the dimensions, pace, and nature of the changes in the system of international relations occurring before our eyes are attracting the ever increasing attention of researchers both in our country and abroad. Here, together with an analysis of specific events and the new phenomena of world politics of recent years, attempts are increasingly being made to embrace the totality of shifts in the international arena and to elicit general trends and prospects in this sphere. In the West these attempts devolve, as a rule, into bourgeois scholars' construction of speculative, abstract-formal schemes. Things are different in the socialist countries.

The studies of a synthetic nature undertaken in the Soviet Union on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology and the fundamental propositions of CPSU congresses, Central Committee plenums, and the speeches of L. I. Brezhnev analyze the fundamental problems of contemporary international relations and reveal their profound natural patterns. The book under review by N. Lebedev is such a work. The author has posed in it and, on the whole, successfully resolved the task not only of a concrete-historical analysis but also of a theoretical generalization of the most important phenomena and processes of the contemporary stage of international political development.

The center of the study is the process of relaxation of tension in relations between states with different social systems, which is examined in the context of a reorganization of the entire system of international relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. In analyzing intricate problems of the two systems' interstate relations the author describes the peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist states not as some kind of

*N. I. Lebedev, "Novyy etap mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy" [New Stage of International Relations], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1976, 296 pages.

mechanical combination of "struggle and cooperation," where both these elements operate as equals, as it were, but as a specific form of the class struggle, which presupposes states' cooperation on a broad circles of questions (pp 17-18).

Although the book illustrates chiefly the international events of the first half of the 1970's, more precisely, between the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, the author discerns with full justification the sources of the contemporary process of the reorganization of international relations in the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Lenin's ideas of a just democratic peace, and in the consistent course of the Soviet state's foreign policy aimed at peaceful coexistence with states of the opposite socioeconomic system. A special chapter is devoted to the substantiation of this fundamentally important thesis which reveals Lenin's formulation of the question concerning the class internationalist nature of the peace-loving foreign policy of the victorious working class and contains many ideas which are interesting from a present-day standpoint.

The idea of a democratic peace advanced by V. I. Lenin, the book says, "took its place in the program of the revolutionary party of the proletariat not only as a result of the specific conditions of the First World War; the struggle for peace has always been one of the principles of the proletariat's international policy and an inalienable part of the general struggle for the liberation of the working class" (p 6). And, further: "Lenin's idea of a just democratic peace, that is, of a system of international relations constructed on the basis of general democratic principles, ensued from an analysis of the prospects of the world class struggle: there are no more dependable guarantees of peace and democratic principles in world politics than the revolutionary proletariat; and there were not in the historical reality that had taken shape by the time of the October Revolution more favorable conditions for the successful development of the world revolutionary process than a just democratic peace in the system of interstate relations" (p 9). At the same time the author observes that both prior to and after October V. I. Lenin also viewed the struggle for a democratic peace as a goal of independent significance.

The criticism of leftist concepts, particularly of the correlation of war and revolution, based on Lenin's works which is contained in the chapter is also topical. The theoreticians of "leftism," the book says, "saw only that war could accelerate the maturation of the revolution and refused to see that wars have frequently hindered the unfolding of a revolutionary situation and thereby made the revolution more distant" (p 19). The book underpins this proposition with specific historical examples.

The detailed examination of Lenin's views on the foreign policy of the victorious proletariat convincingly refute the thesis, which is still current in the West, of the supposedly tactical, conjunctural nature of the concept of peaceful coexistence. And if in the first years of Soviet power

this concept did not find extensive practical application, the reason for this was the imperialist, interventionist policy of the ruling circles of the main Western powers. "Peaceful relations," the author observes, "could only be asserted as a result of a long struggle, in which the working people of the capitalist countries and the national liberation movements acted as the allies of the Soviet state. The principles of proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence organically complemented one another in Soviet foreign policy, which aspired to reorganize international relations on a democratic footing" (p 21).

In revealing the historical roots of relaxation and showing the continuity of the CPSU's course aimed at reorganizing international relations the author by no means ignores the fact that the present changes in the two systems' international relations are unprecedented and differ considerably from the thaws in the international climate which occurred in the past. The main feature of contemporary relaxation as a part of the more general process of the reorganization of international relations is its profoundly logical, objective nature. This important proposition permeates the entire book. The author emphasizes with complete justification that the present positive trends in the development of the international situation are underpinned by such an objective foundation as the change in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism and to the detriment of capitalism. Mention should be made here of the breadth of the author's approach to the analysis of the correlation of forces, which amounts to more, in his view, than purely military indicators. The supremacy of socialism, the book says, "is determined not by saber-rattling and the pace of preparations for an armed clash but by the interaction of the totality of elements constituting the state's real might: economic, political, social, and spiritual" (p 17).

The book analyzes in detail the changes in the world situation conditioned primarily by the growth of the forces of world socialism and the successes of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in economic development, the strengthening of their political system, and the increase cohesion of the socialist community.

The author shows that the change in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism began to make itself felt back in the mid-1950's, nipping in the bud imperialism's attempts to undermine socialism's positions in certain countries and to suppress the national liberation movement (the collapse of military aggression against Egypt and the counterrevolutionary uprising in Hungary). The outstanding scientific-technical successes in the Soviet Union, which had accomplished the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite, and the change in the strategic situation in the world also manifested themselves at this time. In subsequent years the positions of socialism have expanded unswervingly, while since the end of the 1950's capitalism has entered the third stage of the general crisis.

While correctly emphasizing and revealing in detail world socialism's leading role in the change in the correlation of forces in the international arena, the author pays relatively less attention to such important factors

of this change as the victories of the national liberation movement and the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and also the intensification of the masses' antiwar activeness. The consequences of the scientific-technical revolution, particularly the appearance and sophistication of thermonuclear weapons, which exerted an extremely substantial influence on the alinement and correlation of forces in the world, might also have merited a more thoroughgoing examination in this context.

The author's recognition of the paramount importance of the objective prerequisites of the contemporary stage of relaxation and of the reorganization of international relations by no means signifies any underestimation of the role of subjective factors in the advantage taken of the favorable opportunities which are emerging under the conditions of the new correlation of world forces. "It is obvious," the book says, "that neither the objective natural patterns of world development nor the positive trends in world politics dictated by them could have been displayed with such fullness without the conscious, purposeful activity of the progressive forces and, primarily, the forces of socialism and without their beneficent effect on the entire international situation," (p 267).

The book's material attests the enormous significance of the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community, reveals the transforming role of the Peace Program of the 25th CPSU Congress and its organic continuation--the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation--which was approved by the 25th CPSU Congress, and shows the dimensions, consistency, and effectiveness of the efforts of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government for the implementation of these programs.

At the same time the book notes the importance of the positions of the biggest capitalist powers from the viewpoint of practical implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence. "As a result of the new situation," the author emphasizes, "the capitalist states are displaying a definite interest in the prevention of nuclear war and in nuclear disarmament. This interests is prompted by the general aspiration of the peoples of all countries, both socialist and capitalist, to limit and, subsequently, halt the arms race" (p 108).

The West's ruling circles' recognition of the groundlessness under the new historical conditions of a "cold war" policy and their revision of their former foreign policy strategy and development of a more realistic course came about in the course of a difficult struggle and took a long time. This process proceeded differently in different countries and was accompanied by vacillation and, at times, outright relapses into a "cold war" policy and, as a result, dragged on for many years.

It was only at the start of the 1970's that the slackening of international tension and the practical embodiment of the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states of the two systems, for which the Soviet Union had striven invariably and consistently, were manifested with full force. The

positive changes in international relations reached a qualitatively new level, and relaxation became the prevailing trend.

N. Lebedev links the new stage of international relations primarily with the development of political cooperation between the states of the two systems, not concealing the fact that the institution of such cooperation is encountering enormous difficulties, for it is here that the collision of the class interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is sharpest of all. But it is precisely the political cooperation of states with different social systems which is, as the author correctly asserts, the essential condition of peaceful coexistence, of the guarantee of peace and the peoples' security, and of the reorganization of international relations as a whole. The accurate and well argued formulation of this question is one of the book's indisputable merits.

"It may be said with all certainty," the book emphasizes, "that in the 1970's relations between the socialist and capitalist countries have embarked on a new stage characterized by the establishment of the stable political cooperation of states of opposite social systems dictated by the interests of preventing a nuclear missile war and insuring peace, security, and international cooperation" (p 85). In this connection the author again draws attention to the objective nature of the positive changes in international life, including the trend toward the political cooperation of the states of both systems, which is intended to be, as N. Lebedev notes, a stabilizing factor of the world situation.

The book examines the concrete spheres and new forms of the two systems' interstate relations. Here cessation of the arms race and the transition to disarmament are undoubtedly in our day of key significance from the viewpoint of the extension of relaxation and completion of the reorganization of international relations. The author devotes a special chapter to these problems whose material illustrated the breadth and enterprise of the Soviet approach to the disarmament problem, to which the "all-or-nothing" approach is alien, and shows the first real steps on the path toward military relaxation.

Summarizing what has been achieved in this important sphere, the author writes: "The fundamental principles of the limitation of states' arms race have for the first time been developed, coordinated, and already expressed in a number of agreements and accords in force: equal security, no detriment to another country's interests, renunciation of the acquisition of unilateral advantages in the process of arms limitation, effective supervision of adherence to adopted commitments, and coordinated actions to forestall the risk of military confrontations and the outbreak of a nuclear missile war. It is possible on the basis of these principles to reach new agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament as a whole" (p 131).

At the same time the book notes the complexity of the tasks in this sphere, speaks of the difficulties and obstacles on the path toward disarmament, and criticizes the dangerous concepts of the supporters of a buildup of forces, which are fraught with the danger of a destabilizing effect. "Disturbance of the parity of forces in the military sphere, which today represents a most important condition of the practical and successful solution of a number of disarmament tasks, would inevitably lend new impetus to the arms race," the author emphasizes (p 135). It seems, however, that he should have dwelt in more detail on the role of military production in the economy of capitalism and on the negative influence of the military-industrial complex and NATO membership on the foreign policy course of a number of countries.

Questions of the economic cooperation of the states of the two systems at the current stage have their own place in the book. The author observes that the policy of "comprehensive development of international cooperation and the active participation of the socialist countries therein is dictated by both the political and economic interests of world socialism and corresponds entirely to the task of insuring social progress, peace, and the peoples' security. This policy is an integral part of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence" (p 138). Particular significance is being acquired by international cooperation in the sphere of science and technology for, as the author observes, scientific-technical autarchy is "an impermissible luxury which ultimately retards scientific-technical progress and, consequently, the development of the production forces" (p 145).

The book also examines questions of the place of the developing countries in the reorganization of international relations and of the significance and nature of assistance to them on the part of the socialist states. N. Lebedev correctly emphasizes that this assistance is not, as distinct from the "aid" of the Western powers, compensation for inflicted damage and not a payment for past sins but that of a friend and ally in the struggle against the common enemy--imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism. However, on the whole, the book illustrates "third world" problems under the conditions of relaxation in a somewhat simplistic and unidimensional manner and without sufficient consideration of the complexity of the processes underway in the developing countries.

The examination in a separate chapter of the interconnection of the problems of the reorganization of international relations with the struggle for social progress is of great interest. Despite certain repetitions, which are partially inevitable, attention to this topic is perfectly justified for the class struggle does not cease even under the conditions of relaxation, while various social forces are attempting to use the new conditions in their own interests. The class approach, which is consistently pursued in the book, makes it possible to show the beneficent consequences of international relaxation for the peoples both of the socialist countries and of the capitalist world.

"A principal result of relaxation for the socialist countries," the book says, "is the enhanced possibility of increasing the amounts of resources for raising the working people's material and cultural living standard" (p 212).

Assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence is also alleviating the struggle for social progress of the working people's masses in the capitalist countries. The communists are in the vanguard of this struggle. "The experience of the capitalist countries' communist parties," N. Lebedev writes, "shows that in an atmosphere of relaxation of tension the communists acquire additional opportunities to rally the anti-imperialist forces in the struggle for democracy and socialism. The weakening of the influence of decrepit anticommunist and anti-Soviet myths is making it possible to more successfully achieve the unity of the workers movement in the struggle for the achievement of these goals" (p 240).

Relaxation is creating more favorable conditions for the struggle for national independence and the solution of urgent tasks of the developing countries, limiting the opportunities of the imperialists and colonialists for retaining their positions in the "third world" with the help of violence.

The work also illustrates certain ideological aspects of the reorganization of international relations and notes the broadening under the conditions of relaxation of the possibilities of the influence of the ideas of peace and socialism on the broadest public circles.

The final chapter critically analyzes bourgeois concepts of relaxation and the reorganization of international relations. The chapter's merit lies in its differentiated approach to them. The book shows that the changes in the views of bourgeois politicians and ideologists are expressed both in the search for contacts with the socialist countries and also in an aspiration to diversify the forms and methods of struggle against socialism, adapting it to the conditions of the international situation. There is an analysis here of the views of, among others, H. Kissinger, G. Ball, A. Buchanan, and many other Western, predominantly American, writers, and the true meaning of the concepts of "polycentrism" and the "superpowers," "wealthy" and "poor" nations, the "obsolescence" of national sovereignty, and so forth which are being propagandized in our day is revealed.

The author also criticizes the abstract-scholastic constructions of certain bourgeois theoreticians who are attempting to prove that the present positive changes in the system of international relations are the result of its "self-development" and a function of the system itself. N. Lebedev formulates his position on this question thus: "The system of international relations is not somehow hard-set; it is in a state of constant development and change, acquiring different qualitative conditions. And the main motivator and chief source of its development are world socioeconomic relations and the struggle of the main socioeconomic systems. It is primarily here

that we should seek the answer to the questions concerning the causes, nature, and content of the dialectically developing process of relaxation and re-organization of the entire system of international relations which is to be observed currently" (p 265).

Summing up the results of the examination of the basic contents of N. Lebedev's new book, I may be confident that it will contribute to a large extent to the extension of our ideas on the problems of the development of contemporary international relations and will be read with interest and benefit both by international affairs specialists and broader circles of Soviet readers.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAVDA, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1977.

8850

CSO: 1800

BOOK CRITICIZES MODERN BOURGEOIS CONCEPTS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 77 signed to press 19 May 77 pp 147-148

/Review by A. Stepanov of the book "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya i Ideologicheskaya Bor'ba (60-70-ye Gody)" /International Relations and the Ideological Struggle (60-70's) by V. Larin, Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, Moscow, 1976, 245 pages/

/Text/ The appearance of our planet has changed beyond recognition during the past 60-year period. The world socialist system has emerged and become stronger. The last colonial empires have collapsed and the national liberation movement of nations is developing far and wide. The role of the working class of capitalist countries, which is delivering perceptible blows to monopolies, has increased as never before.

Leaning on the strength, solidarity and activity of world socialism and on its intensifying alliance with all progressive and peace-loving forces, the Communist Party and the Soviet State have attained a historical turning point in the development of international relations--from the "cold war," which threatened an explosion, to relaxation and normal mutually advantageous cooperation.

In its own way it is natural that the ideologists of imperialist bourgeoisie make desperate efforts to discredit the advances of real socialism and, especially, its fundamental achievements in materializing the relaxation of international tension. Therefore, the paramount task now is to decisively and effectively repulse the ideological subversive activities of imperialist propaganda, which takes on an ever more refined nature. The reviewed book by V. Larin, which contains a critical analysis of the bourgeois concepts of modern international relations, does its bit to realize this urgent task.

The author notes that at present such political dogmas "from the position of strength" as the doctrine of "checking" and "rejecting" communism no longer enjoy the previous esteem. Many famous American researchers and political scientists (H. Kahn, B. Bruce Briggs, Z. Brzezinski and others) do not hide their negative attitude toward the discredited concepts of the past. In an

attempt to retain the popular masses under their ideological-political control the ideologists of imperialist bourgeoisie are preoccupied with a search for new effective means "capable of withstanding," as they themselves admit, "the intensifying positions of Marxist ideology in many countries" (H. Kissinger).

V. Larin skillfully exposes the groundless attempts by bourgeois ideologists to conceal the true class meaning and political trend of the "new" concepts advanced by them and shows that their basic intention is to undermine the unity and solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp.

The work systematically debunks various modernistic concepts, each of which represents a sample of a refined form of anticommunism adapted to the present situation. Whether it is a question of the newly appeared doctrine of "selective coexistence," or of the method of "selective trade" with the socialist countries, in both cases the author exposes their basic pivot--the inveterate anticommunist component.

In particular, V. Larin subjects the concept of "selective trade" with socialist countries to sharp criticism. According to the recommendations offered by it, "providing incentives" for some states and "holding back" others in trade relations should lead to a "reduction in the solidarity of the socialist camp."

The book presents extensive information characterizing all-around cultural relations between the USSR and foreign countries. For example, according to the data of UNESCO, the USSR holds first place in the world in the number of translations from foreign languages. The works of authors from 101 countries, including 522 writers from France, 325 writers from the United States, 316 writers from England, 132 writers from Italy and about 500 authors from Asian and African countries were published in the USSR after the October Revolution (p 193).

V. Larin exposes the complete groundlessness of the statements by the bourgeois propaganda on the existence of a "Soviet threat to the West." These slanders are neither new, nor original. He stressed that such myths are invented in order to cast a shadow on the genuinely peace-loving political line of the USSR, on the one hand, and spur on the arms race, on the other. It is clear that such legends suit primarily the military and industrial complex of imperialist powers.

As V. Larin shows, the appeals for an ideological disarmament of the USSR and ideological demobilization in socialist countries are just as groundless. In fact, they signify an unhindered use by imperialism of subversive activities and provocations against peace and socialism masked under an "ideology."

On the basis of a detailed analysis of the ideological struggle being waged in the sphere of international relations the author arrives at a just and important conclusion that the "crisis of anticommunist strategy is by no means equivalent to a decrease in its danger" (p 235). Under these conditions there is an especially responsible task of maximally increasing attention to the problems of ideological struggle and a tireless exposure of the corrupting influence of bourgeois ideology on the working masses. "While striving for the consolidation of the principles of peaceful coexistence," noted L. I. Brezhnev, "we realize that achievements in this important matter in no way imply the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle. Conversely, we must be prepared for the fact that this struggle will be intensified and become an ever more acute form of antagonism between the two social systems. We have no doubt as to the outcome of this antagonism, because historical truth and objective laws of social development are on our side."

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAVDA, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1977

11,439
CSO: 1800

BOOK ANALYZES STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS OF CAPITALIST ECONOMY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 77 signed to press 19 May 77 pp 151-155

/Review by S. Pervushin of the book "Izmeneniye Struktur Konechnogo Obshchestvennogo Produkta Glavnykh Kapitalisticheskikh Stran" /Change in the Structures of the End National Product of Main Capitalist Countries, by M. V. Barabanov, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, Moscow, 1976, 268 pages

/Text The changes taking place in the reproduction, sectorial and production-technological structure of industrially developed countries attract ever closer attention on the part of researchers. This is fully explicable. The attained level of industrial development and the characteristics of the modern scientific and technical revolution generate a need for a transfer to another type of proportionality and increase in the role of intensive factors in economic growth.

It should be noted that an analysis of the rates and proportions of development of capitalist production is hampered owing to the differences in the system of indicators and statistical methods used in various monographic works. This is one of the reasons for the fact that differences in an evaluation of the nature and scale of structural shifts in capitalist production are observed among the economists dealing with an investigation of the problems indicated. In our opinion, the reviewed work takes an important step forward in overcoming existing methodological difficulties. The first and most important part of this work is devoted to substantiating the methodological techniques of analyzing the structures of the public sector.

The method of analyzing the structure and dynamics of public reproduction used in the monograph is noted for the fact that the author is guided by the final national economic results represented by the end national product which embodies the primary elements of the social value of reproduction ($c_1 + v + m$).

This makes it possible to avoid a recalculation during an analysis of the movement of national production and thus to obtain its more reliable and comparable proportions both in statics and in dynamics.

It is well known that the volumes, dynamics and key structural elements of public reproduction, when evaluated on the basis of gross output, are subject to a distorting effect of the constantly changing recalculation of elements c_2 --the constant capital turned over during the year.¹ The proportion of c_2 is affected by many factors, including the change in the specialization and combination of production, the organizational structure of the economy, methods of statistical measurement and, as pointed out in the book, even the skill level of the workers responsible for the problems of classification of sectors and industries (p 22). All this transforms national economic proportions and the values obtained on the basis of gross output into highly imperfect tools of economic analysis when a precise measurement is needed, for example, when results, resources and expenditures are compared. However, an analysis of the dynamics and structures according to the social value of reproduction with the elimination of c_2 makes it possible to examine national economic relationships in a comparable and invariant form and to give their more accurate interpretation.

Since the social value of reproduction without element c_2 is identical in structure (c_1+v+m) at the levels of the national economy, sector and enterprise, this ensures an accurate calculation of the social result at the indicated levels and, accordingly, makes it possible to more accurately calculate national economic, sectorial and other indicators of labor productivity, capital-output ratio, capital intensiveness and material intensiveness and integral indicators of the efficiency of use of resources.

In turn, the division of the end national product into means of production and means of consumption characterizes the aspect of the ratio of subdivisions I and II of national production that cannot be reflected by gross output, that is, by the breakdown of the social value of reproduction into the real constant capital invariably attached to the production process and into the remaining part of social value. This characteristic of the value structure of the end national product also makes it possible to divide social value (social labor) in an objectively accurate way not only according to two subdivisions, but also any spheres and sectors, thereby creating a reliable basis for analyzing the internal proportions of public reproduction expressing the processes of formation of its value in contrast to external proportions represented by the turnover of physical use values. In other words, provision is made for criteria of distribution of public resources among the spheres and sectors of the national economy according to their contribution to national wealth and consumption.

The following fact is also noteworthy: The end national product in its physical form consists mainly of elements of costs of expanded reproduction of the productive forces of society--tools, means of labor and manpower. This characteristic makes it possible to directly connect the structure of the end

1. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 32, p 61.

national economic result with the reproduction of the most active factors in an increase in the productive force of labor and to develop a system of economic relationships--the end product, its two subdivisions, gross accumulation and sectorial structure of production.

Using the data of main capitalist countries, the monograph shows, for example, how with economic development the change in the structure of productive accumulation is followed by changes in the production apparatus and in the sectorial structure of production ultimately leading to a reduction in the capital-output ratio of national production.

The specific economic-statistical realization not only of the principle of investigation of public reproduction according to its end results and primarily value elements, but also in the unity of all its material and nonmaterial elements is to the author's indisputable credit. Although M. Barabanov offers two methods of evaluating end national economic results--as applied to the concept of material production accepted in the USSR Central Statistical Administration and a more expanded method--the latter seems preferable to us, because it solves the problem of evaluating public results as an overall problem of measuring goods and economic services.

The author succeeded in unfolding a wide analytical picture of the development of capital reproduction not only during the postwar years, but also for a longer period. Using the expanded approach to an examination of public reproduction, M. Barabanov undertook original calculations characterizing the change in the quantitative and qualitative indicators of economic development of main capitalist countries from the second half of the last century to the 1970's. The book has more than 70 tables and many figures in the text.

On the basis of a careful analysis of all pertinent statistics the author reaches important conclusions of serious scientific importance both from the point of view of a deeper understanding of the processes occurring in capitalist reproduction and for strategic planning in the USSR. Let us mention the most important of them.

A historical tendency toward an accelerated intensification of capitalist reproduction is observed. This tendency is ensured by an accelerated accumulation of active factors in an increase in the productive force of social labor, among which nonmaterial factors (scientific knowledge, skills, education, production experience and so forth) play an ever greater part. At the same time, the illegitimacy of the statement to the effect that the expansion of constant, in particular fixed, capital lost its significance of a decisive factor in intensification of capitalist production affecting an increase in the productivity of social labor is pointed out. The experience in the postwar development of such countries as Japan, FRG, France and others showed that their economic results are connected primarily with an accelerated and highly efficient productive accumulation.

The essence of the problem of intensification of national production is reduced primarily to the intensification of the investment process. Capital accumulation should not be considered only an extensive factor in production growth. The book stresses the need to refine the ideas of the efficiency, intensification, types and factors of growth. To avoid one-sidedness, these ideas should take into consideration not only the efficiency, but also the dynamics of processes not lastly determined by an expansion of the factors themselves.

The historical tendency of development of the basic economic proportion of capitalist reproduction--between means of production and means of consumption--for example, toward an increase in the proportion of means of production, should be considered one of the structural forms of its intensification. Stabilization and reduction of the proportion of means of production in the annual product make up another form. The latter, as a newer form of intensification, is manifested at a high level of development. This principle is contained in the characteristics of the two types of technical progress and, accordingly, two methods of increase in the productive force of labor and two forms of intensification. The first form of intensification is distinguished by an increase in the means of labor per unit of live labor. In the second form an increase in the efficiency of means of labor (use of more productive equipment and advanced techniques) acquires primary importance. In this case the saving of live labor should be considered the basic indicator in production intensification and the saving of past labor, the additional indicator.

Of indisputable interest is the indication that the first form of intensification essentially coinciding with the initial stage in industrial development ended in the United States in the 1920's and in Western European countries and Japan, in the 1950's and 1960's (p 173 and so forth). The second form of intensification is characterized by a transition to a more efficient reproduction structure.

Improvement in the technological structure of the investment flow is an important criterion of the last form of intensification. Whereas at the early stages of economic development the outstripping growth of means of production in the end national product is connected primarily with accumulation in buildings and installations, at later stages, primarily with accumulation in production equipment, in particular the most advanced machinery. "Under present conditions the countries that ensure the greatest increase in part of the national production turning out equipment for production needs attain the greatest achievements in an increase in the rates of growth and level of development. Japan and FRG are among such countries" (p 122). At the same time, economic growth depends to an ever smaller degree on the mass of used labor and the rates of increase in the end national product are separated from the rates of population growth. The saving of live labor is supplemented by the saving of past labor, the latter becoming a more or less constant factor in production intensification manifested not only at low, but also at high rates of growth of the end national product (p 173).

The change in the sectorial structure of accumulation of fixed capital toward an increase in the proportion of less capital-intensive sectors in its total volume forms an important aspect of the intensification of the capitalist economy, which along with other factors leads to a reduction in the capital-output ratio of national production. In connection with this the study draws an important conclusion to the effect that a reduction in the proportion in total production of the part of means of labor assigned to extractive sectors and to the infrastructure of the economy and an increase in the proportion of the part assigned to manufacturing sectors, the service sphere and the production of nonmaterial wealth represent the main trend in the investment process with the attainment of the appropriate economic and technical potential.

The study notes that the continuing absolute increase and in a number of countries (Japan, FRG, France and England) acceleration of the accumulation of physical fixed capital accompanied by an even greater acceleration of the accumulation of nonmaterial wealth remain the major factors in the intensification of the capitalist economy.

An analysis shows that an absolute expansion of capital retains its importance as the target function of the capitalist economy and the most important stimulator of increase in the productive force of social labor. Whereas during the seven decades preceding World War II (1869-1939) the average annual rates of increase in the fixed capital in the United States comprised approximately 3.8 percent, in Japan, 5.1 percent (1905-1939), in Germany, 2.7 percent and in England, 1.4 percent, during the 20 postwar years (1950-1970) they comprised 3.1 percent in the United States, 8.7 percent in Japan, 5.5 percent in FRG and 2.9 percent in England. The rates of capital accumulation also greatly increased in France--4.7 percent (p 231).

The methodology of analyzing the structure of public reproduction developed by M. Barabanov makes it possible not only to more accurately show the change in basic proportions and, accordingly, the methods of attaining the basic goals which a specific type of reproduction and a specific social form set for themselves, but also to more visually show these goals. The latter is illustrated by a change in both physical and reproductive value structures of the end national product, in particular, by a change in the relationship $c_1 + m$ and between means of production and elements of nonpersonal nonproduction consumption (means of defense, general administration and so forth) and the consumption of bourgeoisie and personal consumption of workers. Expansion of the wealth and all living conditions of the ruling classes on the basis of the accumulation of capital and the maximum possible intensification of its use are such goals for the capitalist social system.

The proposed methodology and its application to an investigation of the changing structure of capitalist reproduction contain a number of other highly important results. Among them the data characterizing the manifestation of the law of irregular economic development of capitalist countries deserve to be mentioned.

In two decades (1950-1970), on the whole, the proportion of the end national product increased, as compared with that of the United States and Japan, from 10.2 to 30.6, and of FRG, from 11.7 to 23.9 respectively, whereas in England it decreased from 19.8 to 18.0. This irregularity was revealed to an even greater extent in the production of the end national product and in the per-capita production of means of production. Whereas in Japan the level of per-capita production of the end product increased from 18.4 in 1950 to 60.4 in 1970, as compared with the level in the United States taken as 100, and the per-capita production of means of production, from 20.2 to 111.9, and in FRG from 37.3 to 82.3 and from 34.5 to 97.4 respectively, in England the per-capita production of the end national product, as compared with the United States, was reduced from 59.9 to 56.2, while the per-capita production of means of production, as compared with the United States, increased from 45.9 to 68.8, which indicates the further relative weakening of England's positions (p 232).

The methodological elaboration of the problems of analyzing the structure of public reproduction on the basis of the category of the end national product carried out in the monograph is of great practical importance. The author not only uncovered the economic content of this category more fully than done thus far, but also showed the analytical loads that this indicator can carry. He stressed that under the present conditions of socialist economic development it is necessary to reject the ideas that the end national product does not represent an independent category--a consciously maximized result of socialist public reproduction--which are obviously incorrect and do not meet the spirit of the time and party decisions. He also showed that the category of the end national product should not be confused with the category of the national income, as is the case in the modern practice of planning. Finally, he noted the need to further improve the methodology of planning through a more systematic application of the category of the end national product in it. Methodological and applied data also give grounds for a number of other conclusions and generalizations as applied to the present stage in the development of productive forces in capitalist and socialist countries.

The importance of this very valuable study would be increased even more if the author had more objectively examined the possibilities of and trends in the use of the proposed methodological approach to an analysis of socialist reproduction.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAVDA, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1977

11,439
CSO: 1800

END